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ABSTRACT
This thesis will delve into the unfolding of the Italian Resistance, from an underground
association to a militant organization, which aided and facilitated the Allied advance to northern
Italy. Particular emphasis will be placed on the actions and consequences of the Resistance in
rural Tuscany and their affect on the local population. It will examine the changing views of
Italian society, from the immediate post-war era and the decades that followed, with a brief
examination of the cinematographic influences on the social views. It will include the debate
over who deserves a commemorative monument and the divided and changed memory regarding
the Resistance. Finally, the author will examine the current debate over the most appropriate
way to memorialize the complicated and tumultuous struggle to free Italy over sixty years ago.
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ABBREVIATIONS

ANPI

Associazione Nazionale Partigiani Italiani

CLN

Comitato di Liberazione Nazionale

CTLN

Comitato Toscano di Liberazione Nazionale

DC

Democrazia Cristiana

GAP

Gruppi di Azione Patriottica

MSI

Movimento Sociale Italiano

OSS

Office of Strategic Services

PCI

Partito Comunista Italiano

PDA

Partito d‘Azione

RSI

Repubblica Sociale Italiana

SIM

Servizio Informazioni Militari

SOE

Special Operations Executive

7
GLOSSARY
Associazione Nazionale Partigiani Italiani. Italian National Association of Partisans.
Attendisti. Those who wait.
Comitato di Liberazione Nazionale. Committee for National Liberation.
Comitato Toscano di Liberazione Nazionale. Tuscan Committee for National Liberation.
Democrazia Cristiana. Christian Democrat Party.
Duce. Leader.
Gruppi di Azione Patriottica. Groups of Patriotic Action.
Movimento Sociale Italiano. Italian Socialist Movement – the post-war neo-Fascist Party.
Padrone. Master.
Partito Comunista Italiano. Italian Communist Party.
Partito d’Azione. Action Party.
Rastrellamento. Raking. The search for eligible men for conscription.
Repubblica di Saló. Saló Republic. Other name for the Italian Social Republic, the puppet
government set up by Hitler with Mussolini as figure-head, with its capital in the town of Saló,
Northern Italy.
Repubblica Sociale Italiana. Italian Social Republic.
Risorgimento. Resurgence. The 19th-century movement for Italian unification that culminated
in the establishment of the Kingdom of Italy in 1861.
Ronda. Military patrol.
Servizio Informazioni Militari. Service of Military Information.
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Map 1
Map of Italy with two major German defensive lines and Italian cities of interest.
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Map 3
Topographic map of Tuscany.

INTRODUCTION

Is the Italian Partisan in the Second World War a hero or a terrorist? Until a few
years ago the question would not have been debated. Most agreed that the Partisan was a
hero fighting to free his country of the brutal invader who, through the use of terror, had
transformed his independent people into quasi-slaves with no say in their government,
lives, or personal behavior. It was during the summer of 2007, at a café in Marina di Pisa
that a group of local patrons carried out a heated debate regarding a pending
commemoration of the Resistance movement. The debate was over which Partisan
group truly deserved to be recognized for an act of sabotage in the city of Pisa. The
discussion was passionate, as is typical of any Italian political or sports debate, and while
the volume continued to escalate and men continued to promote which group they
believed to be the true heroes, an old gentleman mumbled, ―Heroes, what heroes? They
were terrorists, all of them. They were no better than the terrorists of 9-11. All
cowards!‖ His comments sparked questions about the reason for his resentment. His
response was that the Partisans had brought more suffering to his town than the Fascists
or Germans ever did. According to his account, the Partisans stole from the locals,
brought trouble to the town that had previously been ignored by the Germans, and after
committing petty crimes against the locals and the Germans, ran away to the hills and
safety, leaving the local civilian population to deal with the repercussions. They did not
act honorably but behaved like thugs who took advantage of the situation to subdue the
local population, depriving them of whatever they deemed necessary to the Resistance‘s
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effort. Instead of protecting the innocent civilians, they sacrificed them with their
bravados.1
So, is the Partisan a hero or a terrorist? The question is very simple. The answer
is anything but simple; it depends on one‘s political view, personal experiences, and time
in history. The Merriam-Webster on line dictionary defines Partisan as one who displays
―a firm adherence to a party, faction, cause, or person; especially, one exhibiting blind,
prejudiced, and unreasonable allegiance.‖ This meaning describes those who joined the
Partisan movement for political ideology but leaves out large sections of people who
joined the movement for a myriad of reasons which were not necessarily political.
Merriam-Webster‘s second definition of Partisan is ―a member of a body of detached
light troops making forays and harassing the enemy; a member of a guerrilla band
operating within enemy lines.‖ This description of military operations ascribes a
nationalistic quality to the Partisans as freedom fighters who were trying to defeat the
Germans and Fascists.2
The Italian Partisan has been portrayed by many as a patriot, motivated by
political ideology, who fought the Fascist regime and the enemy invader who suppressed
the Italian people. The Partisan is often romanticized by being depicted as a fighter, who
through self-sacrifice, continued endangerment, and acts of heroism fought to liberate
Italy. In reality, those who initially opposed Fascism in the 1920s and 1930s were

1

2

Discussion by unidentified individuals witnessed by the author.
Merriam-Webster.com, s.v. "partisan," http://www.merriam- webster.com/dictionary/partisan

(accessed March 23, 2009).
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quickly silenced by Mussolini‘s administration through exile, imprisonment or death.
Those who eluded the Fascist control went into voluntary exile or stayed underground
until the fall of Mussolini and the Fascist regime.3 The biggest single event that
prompted the formation of various groups of Italian combatants didn‘t take place until the
fall of the Fascist government on 25 July 1943, when the resisters saw for the first time a
real opportunity to take control of their lives and fight for the freedom of their country.
The Merriam-Webster dictionary defines a hero as ―a mythological or legendary
figure often of divine descent with great strength or ability; an illustrious warrior; a man
admired for his achievements and noble qualities; one that shows great courage.‖ The
definition of a terrorist is ―one who uses violence or the threat of violence, against the
civilian population, usually for the purpose of obtaining political or religious goals.‖ The
definition of terrorism has undergone a transformation with time. The original meaning
of ―terrorism,‖ a term coined during the French Revolution, was the embodiment of
virtue and democracy, purposeful for the creation of a better society; a definitely positive
description. It was only with time that the term was negatively transformed into
representing random and indiscriminate acts associated with abuse of office and power.4
If a Partisan performs an act of sabotage against a much stronger and better
equipped enemy, does his courage make him a hero? If that same act of violence against

3

Additional information on pre-dictatorship anti-Fascist movements can be found in Charles F.
Delzell, Mussolini’s Enemies: The Italian Anti-Fascist Resistance (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1961); Stanislao G. Pugliese, Carlo Rosselli: Socialist Heretic and Anti-Fascist Exile (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1999); R.J.B Bosworth, Mussolini’s Italy: Life under the Dictatorship 1915-1945 (New
York: The Penguin Press, 2006).
4

Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 3-4.
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the enemy results in injury to the civilian population, either through the act itself or
enemy retaliation to it, is the perpetrator a terrorist? Even worse, is the Partisan a
terrorist against his own people? None of the above descriptions can explain what
constitutes a Partisan and the complex make-up of what became the Italian Resistance
movement. Partisanship was a multifaceted issue at the time and continues to be debated,
with an ever-changing impact on Italian people and their history.
The description of Partisans, heroes, and even terrorists does not pertain to a
myriad of people who were directly or indirectly involved in the Italian Resistance
movement. Beyond the minority of fighters who intentionally joined the Resistance for
political ideology were a majority of individuals who involved themselves with the
movement due to circumstances and/or basic moral beliefs that induced them to perform
acts considered subversive by the enemy. The deeds included basic ―Christian‖ or
humane acts toward fellow humans, whether Italians or escaped Allied prisoners of war,
that had no political motivation. Some became involuntarily caught up in the Resistance
through threats or circumstances, others made a conscious decision to put themselves and
their families in danger by ―doing the right thing‖ and protecting those they considered
persecuted innocents or heroes fighting a Goliath.
This thesis will delve into Italian Partisanship, with particular emphasis on rural
Tuscany. It will briefly examine the cinematographic influence on the changing view
regarding Italian society from the immediate post-war era and the decades that followed.
It will include the debate over who deserves a commemorative monument and the
divided and changed memory regarding the Resistance. Finally, the author will examine

16
the current debate over the most appropriate way to memorialize the complicated and
tumultuous struggle to free Italy over sixty years ago.
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CHAPTER 1
TURMOIL AND CONFUSION IN ITALY

Brief history of events leading to Fascism and the rise of Mussolini
Benito Mussolini rose to power fairly easily. The Italian unification (1861-1870)
had drawn borders around the new nation state of Italy but did nothing to unify the
people.5 Most industry was still concentrated in the northern part of the country while the
south had few roads, lacked railways, and remained primarily rural and agricultural. The
northern Italians considered the southerners ignorant and backward, while the southerners
viewed the northerners as just a new set of padroni (masters). Cultural differences were
enormous; the north had a definite Germanic trait imposed by years of Austrian rule
while the southern culture was a mixture of Greek, Arabic, Spanish and French
influences. Carlo Levi‘s book, Christ stopped at Eboli, describes both the northerner‘s
concept of the southerner‘s almost primitive culture and the southerner‘s distrust of the

5

Detailed information on nationalism and the rise of liberalism in Europe can be found in: E.J.
Hobsbawm, The Age of Revolution 1789 – 1848 (New York: The World Publishing Company, 1962);
Melvin Kranzberg, 1848: A Turning Point? (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath and Company, 1959); W.E.
Mosse, Liberal Europe: The Age of Bourgeois Realism 1848 – 1875 (London: Thames and Hudson LTD,
1974). Specific information on the Italian Risorgimento can be found in: Albert Russell and Krystyna
Von Henneberg, Making and remaking Italy: the cultivation of national identity around the Risorgimento
(Oxford: Berg, 2001); Kent Roberts Greenfield, Economics and Liberalism in the Risorgimento: a study of
nationalism in Lombardy, 1814-1848 (Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press, 1934); Attilio Marinai e
Giovanni Pirodda, La cultura meridionale e il Risorgimento (Roma: Laterza, 1975); Lucy Riall, The
Italian Risorgimento: state, society, and national unification (London: Routledge, 1994).
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northerner. Levi was a northerner who was ―exiled‖ to the southern town of Eboli in
1935 for being anti-Fascist.6
The religious-political gap was very distinctive; in the north, intellectuals pushed
for social reform and political involvement in a constitutional monarchy which would
allow people‘s participation in the progress of their new nation. Most southerners were
not accustomed to involvement in government and were more interested in owning a
piece of land and being left in peace. In the north, religion was separated from politics,
while in the south, the Church maintained a stronghold on the people. With the exception
of the enclave around the Vatican palace, the Papal States had been annexed during the
unification of Italy. The Pope was offered nominal sovereignty, church income, and
guaranteed exemption from taxes; however, the king would have sovereignty over
governmental affairs. The Pope refused these conditions and preferred a self-imposed
internment in the Vatican. He also prohibited ―good Italian Catholics‖ from participating
in public affairs in Italy. The issue of Papal versus monarchical sovereignty affected the
daily lives of Italians who could not commit their loyalty to one over the other.7
The ―Roman Question‖ put pressure on many Italians who were trying to
maintain their status as good Catholics while working out their place in current politics.
In addition to the dissimilarity in socio-economic, political, and cultural statuses, Italians
were divided by language. While the Tuscan Italian was recognized as the ―official‖

6

Carlo Levi, Christ Stopped at Eboli: The Story of a Year (1947; repr., New York, Farrar, Straus,
and Giroux, 2006).
7

2007), 143.

Christopher Duggan, A Concise History of Italy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,

19
Italian language, each region had its own distinct dialect with the result that most
illiterate or poorly educated people from one region could not understand those from
another.8
None of these issues had been resolved when Italy entered World War I. In the
years leading to World War I, Italy was part of the Triple Alliance (with Germany and
Austria-Hungary) in an effort to protect its northern borders from Germanic invasion.
Initial adherence to the Triple Alliance had come as a result of Italian frustration over the
French annexation of Tunisia. However, due to the unpopularity of its alliance with
Austria-Hungary, which had opposed Italian unification, Italy eventually joined the
Triple Entente (Great Britain, France, and Russia) after secretly signing the Treaty of
London on April 26, 1915. The treaty guaranteed Italy the annexation of the Trentino
region, Trieste, South Tyrol, Istria, Dalmatia, Fiume, and a portion of German colonies in
Africa.9 The Italian military were poorly trained and equipped but fought on the side of
the Allies against their old foe, Austria-Hungary, and its ally, Germany, hoping to share
in the partition of Africa and achieve the status of colonizer. The Italian military suffered
over 600,000 dead and over 950,000 wounded in the conflict.
At the end of the war the Italians lost trust in the government that had led them
into a conflict with the promise of gaining what they perceived as rightfully Italian
territories guaranteed to Italy in the Treaty of London but not fully delivered. Italy

8

9

Anthony James Joes, Mussolini (New York: Franklin Watts, 1982), 38.

Treaty of London, 1915. Parliamentary Papers, London, Li Cmd. 671, Miscellaneous No. 7, 27. http://www.firstworldwar.com/source/london1915.html (accessed March 29, 2009).
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annexed some of the promised territories, but neither Dalmatia, nor Fiume, nor Albania
was given to Italy at the end of the war. Neither did Italy inherit German colonies.10 Italy
supported the war effort with heavy foreign loans, but after the war other nations had also
exhausted their treasuries, and one of the key components of the Italian economy, the
tourism industry, floundered. Confronted by falling revenue and rising unemployment,
the value of the lira fell to one-thirtieth that of its pre-war level.11 Many Italians began
looking at the Soviet Union as an example of economic success, and left-wing ideology
spread.
In the atmosphere of utter discontent, with increasing workers‘ strikes, contempt
for the government, and disunity among the Italians, Benito Mussolini stood out as the
deliverer of hope to the Italian people. He began as a prominent journalist who left the
Socialist Party after it denounced Italy‘s involvement in World War I during the war. He
then founded a nationalist and strongly interventionist newspaper, the Popolo d’Italia.
After the war, he built the Fascist movement around himself, focusing initially on
nationalism, order, and veterans‘ interests. Fascism promoted government control over
most social programs and aspects of life, but unlike communism, it allowed private
property and enterprise. The promise of social reforms appealed to the lower classes,
while the assurance of continued private enterprise appealed to the middle classes.
Mussolini sent out gangs of thugs to incite riots with the Communists and then used his

10

John Pollard, The Fascist Experience in Italy (New York: Routledge, 1998), 18-19; United
Kingdom. "Parliamentary Papers, London, 1920, LI Cmd. 671, Miscellaneous No. 7, 2-7."
11

Francesco Giavazzi and Luigi Spaventa, High Public Debt: the Italian Experience
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 190; and Michele Fratianni and Franco Spinelli, A
Monetary History of Italy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 122-124.
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Blackshirts to restore order. In October 1922 he ordered his forces to march to Rome and
take over the government. King Victor Emmanuel responded by giving Mussolini the
position of Prime Minister in an attempt to avert a possible civil war. Mussolini
continued his manipulations, consolidated his power, and by 1927 was dictator of Italy.
His charisma, his eventual endorsement by the king, his proposal to truly unify the Italian
people and restore national greatness and prosperity, and his promise to restore a Roman
Empire and develop the economy of the nation, made him the man in whom many
Italians put their hopes and trust. Mussolini placated the left wingers with the initiation of
social programs. He incorporated some socialist ideas in his plan to advance Italy, to
include expanding health services, promoting youth programs for the poorer population,
expanding roads and railways into southern Italy, and bringing industry to the south.12
Mussolini also solved the ―Roman Question‖ with the Lateran Agreements of
1929 that recognized the Pope as sovereign over the Vatican City State in return for Papal
recognition of the existence and sovereignty of the Italian Kingdom that maintained
Rome as its capital city.13 The agreement included a financial compensation to the
church for the loss of its territories during the Risorgimento and the recognition of
Catholicism as the state religion of Italy. Most leading Fascists were instinctively antiChristian, and not a single important Fascist was known to be a devout Catholic.

12

13

Duggan, 217.

―Holy See and Italy: Lateran Pacts of 1929, http://www.aloha.net/~mikesch/treaty.htm
(accessed March 27, 2011); Holy See and Kingdom of Italy. "Lateran Treaty." February 11, 1929.
www.vaticanstate.va/NR/rdonlyres/3F574885-EAD5-47E9-A547-C3717005E861/2528/LateranTreaty.pdf
(accessed March 27, 2011).
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Nevertheless, Mussolini realized the political importance of the Church in governing the
Catholic masses and used the Lateran Agreements to increase his personal prestige and
power.14
In the beginning most Italians were not bothered by Mussolini‘s dictatorial regime
or his use of terror against political dissidents. Many believed he brought stability and a
promise of prosperity to a nation which had been in a state of disruption for seven
decades since the unification of Italy. Hannah Arendt makes a distinction between
dictatorial terror and totalitarian terror. The former occurs when the dictator threatens
authentic opponents but not harmless citizens without a political opinion; the latter occurs
when all citizens are threatened regardless of political opinion. Italy, at least at the
beginning, fell under the category of dictatorial regime. Aldo Capitini describes the
dictatorial terror and the progression of Fascist power within the high school in Pisa
(Tuscany), where students of diverse political thoughts went from freedom to persecution
in just one decade, while Niccolo Mezzetti describes the brutal treatment by the Fascists
on the alabaster workers in Volterra (Province of Pisa) because of their Resistance to
Fascism.15
The cult of personality established Mussolini as the Duce (leader), strong, bold,
and able to transform Italy from a poor and backward nation into an empire to be

14

James Joes, 215; Giorgio Angelozzi Gariboldi, Il Vaticano Nella Seconda Guerra Mondiale
(Milano: Mursia, 1992), 12.
15

Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (New York: Harvest Book, Harcort, Inc.,
1976), 322; Aldo Capitini, ―Antifascismo alla Normale di Pisa‖ in Resistenza ai Giorni Nostri (Pisa:
A.N.P.I., 2005), 17-21; Niccolo Mezzetti, ―Festeggiavano la Festa del Lavoro Bastonando Brutalmente i
Lavoratori‖ in Resistenza ai Giorni Nostri (Pisa: A.N.P.I., 2005), 36.
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reckoned with. The Duce had an imposing physical presence; he communicated with his
body and was the epitome of modern masculinity.16 Mussolini began the Italian rebirth
with the Corfu incident in 1923. Italian forces constituted part of a multinational military
detachment authorized by the League of Nations to settle a boundary dispute between
Greece and Albania. Four Italian soldiers were murdered in an ambush on August 27,
1923. Mussolini demanded monetary compensation and the execution of the guilty. The
Greek government was slow in complying with Mussolini‘s demands so he retaliated by
bombarding the Isle of Corfu and killing civilians. The League of Nations initially
condemned Italy but ordered Greece to pay the monetary damages.17
Italy gained little by the scuffle, but the pallid international response suggested to
Mussolini that the world community was not going to interfere in Italy‘s intimidating
tactics.

Nevertheless, Mussolini did not pursue expansion of the empire until his power

and the Fascist regime were consolidated in Rome. After a decade-long effort, in 1932
he suppressed rebellious tribesmen in Libya using extreme force and mustard gas.18

By

1935 the Duce felt it was time for Italy to invade Abyssinia (Ethiopia), expand Italy‘s
empire, and take its rightful place as a world power.19 Italian aggression that year was

16

Sergio Luzzatto, The Body of Il Duce: Mussolini’s Corpse and the Fortunes of Italy.
Translated by Frederika Randall (New York: Metropolitan Books – Henry Holt and Company, 2005), 16.
17

John Gooch, Mussolini and his Generals: The Armed Forces and Fascist Foreign Policy, 19221940 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 8.
18

19

Duggan, 233.

A general overview of Italian Fascist Foreign policy can be found in: Renzo De Felice,
Interpretations of Fascism. Translated by Brenda Huff Everett (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1977); Renzo DeFelice, Il Fascismo e l’Oriente: arabi, ebrei e indiani nella politica di Mussolini (Bologna:
Societa‘ editrice il Mulino, 1988).
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condemned by the League of Nations, and severe economic sanctions were imposed.
Public condemnation of the Italian invasion by Great Britain and France did not save
Ethiopia; it did, however, encourage Mussolini to retaliate in 1936 by joining with
Adolph Hitler and declaring the ―Rome-Berlin Axis,‖ a seemingly natural bond between
two powers which shared an overtly revisionist international agenda, distrust of
Bolshevism, and militaristic nationalism.20
Mussolini‘s new direction brought with it ominous changes in domestic and racial
policies. In 1938, the Fascist government enacted a series of anti-Semitic measures
which clearly mimicked those of Nazi Germany. The laws removed Jews from
government jobs and prohibited Jewish children from attending public schools. These
measures were seen by many Italians as an arbitrary infusion of racial policy from
beyond the Alps, and many Italians initially simply did their best to ignore them. Over
time however, resentment and revulsion over this baffling turn in Mussolini‘s policy
would fuel the growing resistance to Fascist policy in Italy.
The Mismanagement of War
Italy entered World War II as Germany‘s ally on June 10, 1940. Due to poor
leadership, inadequate equipment, and, on occasion, poor motivation on the part of the
common soldiers, sailors, and airmen, the Italian military suffered serious reverses. Interservice rivalry between the Italian army, navy, and air force further hampered the
effective prosecution of the war effort. Mussolini‘s own role in overseeing war-related

20

Gooch, 316.
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matters was likewise disruptive. He had taken personal control over the armed forces in
1933, committed to the Fascistisation of the military, and believed he had the necessary
skills to manage the war effort. However, he based his decisions on intuition rather than
consultation with experienced military officers, and he did not address the pressing issue
of Italy‘s outdated war equipment. Instead he insisted that high morale, not technology,
was the key to success.21
The litany of failures was long. The Italian army‘s poor showing in the French
Alps in the summer of 1940 was followed by a debacle in Greece in the fall. In spring
1941 Italy lost its East African Empire. That same year Mussolini committed over
200,000 Italian troops to Hitler‘s Russian campaign. In the winter of 1942-1943, most of
these forces would be annihilated during the Stalingrad campaign, a sacrifice that seemed
particularly senseless to an increasingly Germanophobic Italian populace. Finally, and
most famously, between June 1940 and May 1943 Italy lost Libya, its colony for over
thirty years.22
Morale among Italian soldiers continued to decline as they questioned the purpose
of continued impossible objectives. As early as March 1943 an Italian artillery officer
tried to explain the attitude of the Italian fighting man in a letter to his girlfriend. He

21

Information on the weakness of the Italian armed forces is detailed in John Gooch‘s Mussolini
and His Generals; Frederick P. Miller et al., Royal Italian Army (1914-1946): Royal Italian Army, Military
History of Italy During World War II, Military Production During World War II, Italian Invasion of
France, Italian Invasion of Egypt (Mauritius: Alphascript Publishing, 2009); Albano Castelletto‖s, ―The
Last Horse Warrior.‖ Translated by Philip Monteleoni. World War II Magazine (January 2004 Issue).
Detailed information on Italy‘s technological and industrial shortcoming can be found in Richard Overy‘s,
Why the Allies Won (New York: Norton and Co., 2005).
22

Duggan, 237-238.
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tried to define morality and conscience and the need for the individual to adhere to a set
of instinctive values comparable to the environment in which he lived.
Even thieves and assassins give a certain value to life and live according to their code.
To them, life would not have the same value if they were forced to live under a different
code. The Germans give proof of this because they fight for their world and each
individual feels its presence and is willing to do whatever it takes to protect it. The same
goes for the Russians, and even the British and the Americans. The Italians do not have
this imperative. Our moral structure is weak and we do not have the same sense of duty.
We have no sense of direction because we have no-one to guide us. We have plenty of
courageous men but lack able and responsible individuals.23

Adding to the soldiers‘ moral conflict was the contradictory stance of the Catholic
Church which through centuries of political division and foreign occupation remained the
one unifying link of the Italian people. Catholics were taught to obey authority but also
to have compassion and mercy for all men. The Church failed to denounce the atrocities
committed by the Fascists and the Nazis which added to soldiers‘ sense of loss of
leadership and guidance.
By summer 1943 it was Italy‘s turn to face invasion. On July 9, Allied forces
invaded Sicily. The military setbacks also masked a more serious problem within Italy.
By this time Mussolini‘s popularity in Italy had plummeted and many Italians were no
longer willing to blindly follow and obey him. Their growing resentment of his pseudoNazi policies induced Italians from a variety of backgrounds to participate in protecting
those persecuted by the Fascists. Many Italians refused to turn in names of known Jews
when the anti-Jewish laws were passed in Italy in 1938. In the city of Pisa there were no

23

Bianca Ceva, 5 anni di storia italiana 1940-45 da lettere e diari di caduti. (Milan: Arnoldo
Mondadori, 1964), 194.
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signs of Jewish persecution until the evening of October 28, 1942 when Jewish-owned
stores were defaced with writings describing Jews as traitors, spies, parasites, etc., or by
breaking the glass windows of the shops.24 When round-ups began in 1943, entire
communities participated in protecting Jewish refugees. A prime example is the town of
Nonantola in Emilia Romagna, where in 1943 ninety Jewish children were hidden in the
seminary, parish nursery, and private homes until they were safely conducted to
Switzerland. All the townspeople kept quiet, and none of the refugees were
compromised.25 The overwhelming majority of Italians would not be accomplices to the
deportation and possible murder of the Jews.
The Italians may have suspected but did not know the particulars of the German
―final solution,‖ just that Jews, Jehovah Witnesses, gypsies, homosexuals, and other
targeted groups were being deported to concentration camps. Italian officials were given
no detailed information regarding the deportations and when they tried to inquire were
only told that those groups were a threat to society and had to be removed. Italian
soldiers returning from the Russian front brought news of some of the horrors. The
Italian resolution to not participating in the atrocities was to propose a concentration
camp for the Jewish refugees within the Italian controlled area of Croatia. In June 1942
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General Mario Roatta, commanding general of the area of Slovenia and Dalmatia,
suggested interning the Jews in Italian territory to protect them against deportation.26
Italian soldiers, diplomats and civil servants refused to obey the orders. This act
of defiance by Italian officials took place in September 1942 and is indicative of the
dissent that was spreading among even the higher officials.27 Mussolini was unmoved
and mandated the Jews in areas of Italian control be subject to deportation. The Duce
agreed to the deportation of Serbian Jews; however, he protected Italian Jews and forbade
their deportation until September 16, 1943 when the first consignment of Jews was
shipped from Italy to Auschwitz.28
In addition to the military debacles and disillusionment over the Roman rebirth,
and the revolting racial laws, another major source of discontent among Italians was the
disappointment over labor issues. The labor reforms Mussolini imposed had not
improved the lives of the common workers but gave more control to the ruling class.
Many of the health and youth programs were beneficial but were also used to indoctrinate
the young boys to the Fascist ideology, a fact the Italians did not ignore. In the
atmosphere of utter discontent, the Communists sparked Italian Resistance even before
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the formation of Partisan combat units; as early as March 1943 factory workers in Turin
and Milan began the first large-scale strikes to occur in Axis-dominated Europe.29
By 1943 Italy had been at war for eight years; the Italian military had been
fighting with outdated weapons and insufficient supplies in battles it was not equipped to
win, and it had been poorly led. The fighting had taken place on foreign soil, to expand
an empire in which the common man would not benefit. Many Italians felt like puppets
being led by another padrone in a struggle not theirs. Mussolini, it seems, had brought
order to Italy at the cost to the Italians of their personal freedom and their honor. The
amount of confusion and split alliances is best described by Iris Origo, who stated that by
the spring of 1943 Italians were divided into a myriad of groups to include the
Germanophile Fascists, the moderate Fascists, the anti-Fascists (which included
Monarchists, Republicans, and some Communists), the Army, the Vatican, the House of
Savoy, and the discontented/resentful masses.30
Ironically, the three distinct groups that had previously supported the Duce,
schemed against him by the summer of 1943. The first group of collaborators to
withdraw their support comprised of the Crown, clergy, and state bureaucracy. The
second group included high-ranking military officials who suffered the humiliation of
forcing their poorly trained and equipped troops into battles they were doomed to lose.
The third group consisted of members of the National Fascist Party and included
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Mussolini‘s son-in-law, Galeazzo Ciano, the current Foreign Minister. It was the third
group that eventually changed the course of events and led to the fall of Fascism.31
Mussolini helped initiate the immediate chain of events that led to his dismissal.
In mid-July, in the face of the steadily deteriorating situation in Sicily, Mussolini met
with Vittorio Ambrosio, Head of the General Staff. The Duce informed Ambrosio that he
intended to ask Hitler permission to withdraw Italy from the conflict. Two days later
Mussolini informed the king of his intention to get Italy out of the war as soon as he
brought Italian troops back within the Italian borders.32 Faced with Mussolini‘s open
admission of the bankruptcy his policy, the king searched for a means to remove the
Duce and thereby facilitate Italy‘s exit from the war.
The final push came from the leaders of the Fascist Party looking for a change.
The Fascist Grand Council met on the evening of July 24 to consider Italy‘s future with
Mussolini. Several members concocted a plan for Mussolini‘s removal. At the meeting
Cesare Maria de Vecchi, Governor of the Italian Aegean Islands, blamed Mussolini for
Italy‘s situation, stating that the Duce had surrounded himself with yes-men instead of
those who would speak the truth.33 In an extremely tactful and manipulative
presentation, Dino Grandi, President of the Italian Chamber of Deputies, ostensibly
turned the blame away from Mussolini by stating that it was the Duce‘s commitment to
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the military that forced him to leave the ordinary daily administration in the hands of less
capable men, which resulted in the deterioration of the civilian population.
In fact, Grandi‘s proposal that Mussolini redirect his attention to the civilian
population was a clever ploy to get the Duce to remove himself voluntarily from military
command. He pointed out that it was no longer possible to separate the responsibility of
the current state of affairs from the supreme command. The king, Grandi asserted, had
benefitted greatly from Fascism without assuming any of the responsibilities. Grandi
proposed that it was time for the king to take command of the military and for the Duce
to take off the uniform and return to being the great leader of the party to restore order in
Italy. His speech was non-accusatory toward Mussolini, giving him an out, while lauding
him as a great leader.34
Grandi‘s motion to remove Mussolini as head of the military and return full
constitutional powers to the king passed with a vote of nineteen to seven.35 The
following day the king summoned Mussolini for a meeting. He informed the Duce that
Italians had lost faith in Mussolini. The king personally guaranteed Mussolini‘s safety
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and had him taken in custody by General Angelo Cerica, head of the Carabinieri (Italian
national police force). Mussolini was relocated several times, all in secret, to prevent
him from contacting supporters or Hitler to request help. His whereabouts were also kept
secret to prevent interference by the Germans who at the time had over eight-thousand
well-armed soldiers in the city of Rome and an armored division stationed at Tivoli, just
sixteen kilometers away.36

The forty-five days that changed everything (25 July to 8 September 1943)
With the complicity of the king the Fascist hierarchy managed to dispose of
Mussolini; it did not, however, produce a workable plan to get Italy out of the war.
Marshal Pietro Badoglio, new head of state, believed he could negotiate with the British
and Americans and change the demand for the unconditional surrender of Italy to one of
partnership in the war effort. He needed to secure that partnership before breaking ties
with Germany. This effort was made more difficult by the growing German military
presence in Italy; by mid-summer Germany had seven combat divisions totaling 100,000
troops in the peninsula and occupied all of the significant airfields.37 Failure to
coordinate the reversal of alliances threatened to transform Italy from a German ally to
occupied territory of the Nazis.
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The transition did not go smoothly. Hitler was furious when informed of the
coup. According to Nazi Propaganda Minister Joseph Goebbels, the Fuehrer‘s first
reaction was to enact a contingency plan that would deploy a division of paratroopers
from Southern France and drop them just outside Rome; there they would arrest the king
and his entire family, as well as Badoglio, and bring them to Germany. Hitler would then
restore Mussolini as the head of the Italian government.38 Per the diary of Joseph
Goebbels, Hitler was not sure whether Mussolini would agree to head the government in
opposition to the king but thought that if the king were in German hands the Duce would
have no choice.39 This plan did not materialize, due largely to the initial failure of the
Allies to react to the overthrow of the Fascist dictator.
In an effort to buy time, Badoglio assured Germany that Italy would remain in the
war. Hitler, however, had no trust in the king or the men who replaced Mussolini, and he
immediately began reinforcing the German military presence in Italy. Badoglio‘s
announcement that Italy would remain in the war also had a negative effect on the Italian
people. The Italians held the Duce solely responsible for taking and keeping Italy in the
war. They hoped that the removal of Mussolini would bring peace to Italy and the return
home of the Italian military. When the factory workers at the Piaggio Plant in Pontedera
(Tuscany) heard the radio announcement of Mussolini‘s arrest on 25 July 1943, they
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stopped working, destroyed all Fascist propaganda in the factory, and began celebrating,
believing Fascism had fallen and the war ended.40
To the average Italian the announcement that Italy would remain in the war meant
that the change in leadership essentially brought no new hope or improvement to the
population. The declaration that Italy would remain an ally of Germany also
complicated negotiations with the Anglo-Americans who already distrusted the Italian
government. Prior to the overthrow of Mussolini, monarchists and other anti-Fascists
attempted to negotiate with the British Secret Service who refused anything other than an
unconditional surrender. The overthrow of the Fascist regime surprised Great Britain
and the United States who were unprepared to discuss an alliance with Italy. At the time
of the coup, the Allies had six complete divisions and several independent brigades in
North Africa that were as yet uncommitted to the Sicilian enterprise. These could have
possibly made their way to the Italian peninsula. The missed opportunity of an
immediate alliance between Italy and the Anglo-Americans prevented an eventual
unopposed Allied invasion which might have resulted in the swift expulsion of German
troops from Italy.41
The influx of additional German troops could have been avoided by closing the
Brenner Pass or if Badoglio had stood up to Field Marshal Albert Kesselring,
Commander in Chief of the German Army in Italy. Kesselring met with Badoglio
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immediately after the overthrow of Mussolini and stated he wanted to increase the
number of German troops in Italy to counter further Allied invasion. Badoglio replied
this had nothing to do with him but was a matter for the War Office. His response gave
Kesselring a free hand in the matter, and the paratroopers that Hitler initially wanted to
drop over Rome came over land along with many other troops, including several elite SS
formations, which occupied the entire northern peninsula and took over the railways and
official buildings. It was clear this was not to help Italy but to threaten its
independence.42
Badoglio did nothing to prevent the German invasion, nor did he take immediate
initiative to work out an armistice with the Allies. His inaction prompted Raffaele
Guariglia, the Foreign Secretary, and General Giuseppe Castellano of the General Staff to
make separate and independent attempts to negotiate with the Allies. An initial meeting
between Guariglia and Allied diplomats took place in Tangiers on August 3rd.
Additional separate meetings by Guariglia and Castellano with Allied diplomats took
place in Lisbon later the same month.43 Neither had been given official authority to
negotiate which added to the confusion and distrust on the part of the Allies. Attempts to
negotiate continued through the month of August. The actual agreement was unofficially
reached on 13 August but brought to Rome on the 28th.

The in-fighting among Italian

diplomats over who had the authority to finalize negotiations resulted in loss of time and
postponement of the conciliation. With Badoglio apparently uninterested in taking
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charge, Guariglia gave Castellano the authorization to finalize the negotiations with the
Allies. The agreement included a clause stating that Mussolini would be handed over to
the Allies.44
The actual document was brought to Cassibile (a town in Sicily where General
Harold R.L.G. Alexander, commander of the Mediterranean Theater, made his
headquarters and General Dwight D. Eisenhower was currently located),45 for signatures
on September 3rd, the same day the Allies crossed the Straits of Messina, but the
armistice was not publicly announced until September 8, 1943. The greater Allied land
invasion of the Italian peninsula began on September 9, with landings at Taranto and
Salerno. That same day the king and Badoglio fled to southern Italy and the protection of
the Allies. Badoglio‘s last act before fleeting Rome was to issue a proclamation stating:
Having recognized the impossibility of continuing an uneven fight against the
overwhelming opposing power, with the intention of saving additional and more severe
tragedies to the nation, the government has asked General Eisenhower, head of the Allied
Anglo-American forces, for an armistice. The request has been accepted. Consequently,
every act of hostility against the Anglo-American forces on the part of Italian forces must
cease in all locations. However, the Italian forces will react to eventual attacks by any
other source.46

It was implied that the ―any other source‖ was German. That same evening Radio
London announced the Italian unconditional surrender. It also proclaimed that all Italian
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commanders and soldiers had been informed that they would receive the help of the
Allied soldiers if the Germans tried to disarm them.47
In the continued chaos, Badoglio and his ministers failed to turn Mussolini over to
Eisenhower. Within days of the armistice the Germans had occupied central Italy, and
on September 12, they rescued Mussolini in the Gran Sasso and took him to Germany.
On September 23, 1943 Hitler placed Mussolini in charge of a puppet government in
German-occupied Northern Italy as head of the neo-Fascist Italian Social Republic, the
Repubblica Sociale Italiana (RSI), known unofficially as the Saló Republic, after the
small town on Lake Garda where Mussolini maintained his new ―capital‖.48 Italy was
split in two: the southern portion which had been liberated by the Allies was under the
control of the king and Badoglio, while the center and northern portion were part of the
new Italian Social Republic, headed by Mussolini and under German control. Italy now
had four nominal governments: the Germans in the north, Allies in the south, Fascists set
up by the Germans, and the Badoglio government set up by the Allies.49 In reality the
only two real governments were the German in the north and the Allied in the south.
There were also two Italian militaries: the one under Fascist Mussolini, set up in the north
by the Germans, and the one under Badoglio in the south.
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The Italian military collapse in September 1943
The king and Badoglio left Rome to set up a provisional government in Brindisi.
Other members of the new government and high-ranking military officials also
abandoned Rome to follow and participate in the new administration. The exodus of any
and all that had power or authority to command left the military devoid of leadership.
With nobody left behind to coordinate initiatives or give precise orders, the Italian
military disintegrated.
The Allies and the Germans hastened to fill this leadership vacuum. General
Eisenhower‘s radio announcement of the military armistice with Italy also urged Italians
to aid in the liberation of their country and promised them aid from the Allies.50 The
Germans, for their part, were determined to restore the deteriorating strategic situation
that they now faced in the Mediterranean. They swiftly initiated a plan to deal with the
changing circumstances, fittingly termed Operation ACHSE (Axis). Those Italians who
would fight alongside them would soon find employment with Mussolinii‘s puppet state.
Those who opposed the Germans would be disarmed, enslaved, or shot.
The circumstances surrounding the Italian armed forces that September, therefore,
were chaotic in the extreme. With Italy split in two, soldiers, sailors, and airmen had to
question which was the legitimate government and to whom they owed their allegiance.
Foreign troops were now pouring into Italy, the Allies from the south and the Germans
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from the north. Especially regarding the latter, the question of whether to join them, fight
them, or simply disappear could become a matter of life of death.
Developments in Rome that September graphically demonstrate the dilemma that
Italian soldiers faced. On September 8, 1943 there were four Italian divisions and only
two German divisions in Rome. The Italian position appeared strong, as the Italian
soldiers could count on the support of the Italian people while the Germans could not.
Nevertheless, Marshall Enrico Caviglia, senior Italian military representative in Rome,
signed a truce with General Siegfried Westphal who had assured him of the safety of
Rome upon the surrender of all Italian arms. The following day the Italian Motorized
Armored Corps, consisting of the Piave, Ariete, Granatieri and Centauro Divisions, was
ordered to fall back to Tivoli to ensure the safe conduct of the royal entourage to Pescara.
The commanders of the Piave, Ariete, and Granatieri Divisions disobeyed orders
and with the aid of a spontaneously formed Italian militia, inflicted heavy casualties and
damage to the German forces. However, when they prepared to enter Rome they were
stopped by Marshall Caviglia who felt that Rome was indefensible. Lacking instructions
from the king or Badoglio, he opted for what he considered the best choice for the safety
of Rome; he ordered the Italian troops to cooperate with the Germans. According to an
escaped Italian officer of the Genova Cavalleria who sought refuge with Iris Origo, of the
4,000 Italian officers who supposedly voluntarily joined the Axis forces and were put on
trains headed for Germany, approximately 3,200 escaped before reaching Florence. 51
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Developments outside of Rome often took a different turn. In the wake of the
announcement of the armistice the Allies, many Italian soldiers simply sought to go
home. The experience of Giovanni Pesce in the town of Aqui, Northern Italy was
anecdotal but typical of many Italian soldiers outside of Rome. On the night of
September 8, the soldiers in Pesce‘s unit shed their uniforms, and local women gave them
their husbands‘, brothers‘, or sons‘ civilian clothes to wear. The Italian military were
trying to escape the German and Fascist round-up to avoid transfer to the Russian front or
becoming slave labor in German factories. The Germans surrounded the Italian barracks,
and the local population came to the rescue of the Italian soldiers. The civilians
surrounded the Germans and disarmed them; they then passed the arms to the Italian
military, while yelling at the Italian military to escape.52 Similar events transpired in
Tuscany. Origo describes several accounts of giving civilian clothing to escaped Italian
military, to include Italian soldiers and airmen who made their way back to Italy from
foreign battlefields.53
Other Italian soldiers were not so lucky. For many officers, the option of donning
civilian clothing smacked of cowardice, desertion, and a betrayal of professional values, a
circumstance which made blending in with the civilian population difficult if not
impossible.54 Moreover, many soldiers, officers and enlisted men alike, came under
immediate pressure to support the Germans or, once it was established, Mussolini‘s new
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puppet state in northern Italy, the so-called Social Republic of Italy (RSI). Initially,
approximately one percent of the armed forces chose to collaborate with the Nazis. Over
600,000 who were ensnared in Nazi or Fascist round ups refused collaboration and were
deported as slave laborers north of the Alps. Hitler would not allow the captive Italian
soldiers to be considered as prisoners of war because he recognized only the Fascist state
as legitimate, not the Badoglio government. This meant that the interned soldiers were
not covered by the Geneva Convention; they did not receive Red Cross packages, and
many died of starvation, illness, and overwork.55
Eventually these conditions prompted some of the internees to reconsider their
refusal to serve Mussolini‘s government. Hitler finally allowed 12,000 Italian
―volunteers‖ from the internment camps to join the republican government but insisted
that the remainder of needed recruits come from Italy.56 Mussolini lowered the age of
conscription to eighteen and used his Fascist troops for rastrellamenti (rakings). They
searched houses and establishments for youths trying to escape conscription, the penalty
for which was death. The Fascists were so desperate for men to enroll that they granted
convicts freedom if they joined the army.57 Over time the Duce launched a massive
propaganda campaign and used his loyal Black Shirts to rake in new recruits for the
republican army.
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Unfortunately, the foregoing range of experiences—simple desertion (often
followed by enlistment in the Resistance), recruitment by the Fascists, or enslavement at
the hands of the Germans—does not complete the story of the Italian military collapse of
September 1943. A distressingly large number of Italians were the victims of German
atrocities that stemmed either from the Germans‘ generalized rage over what they saw as
an act of national betrayal or from actual acts of resistance by Italian soldiers and
civilians. According to one estimate, by September 10, 1943, just two days after the
official surrender of Italy to the Allies, over 3,000 Italian military had been killed by the
Germans or the Fascists, and these numbers grew in the weeks that followed.58
The most notorious massacre of Italian soldiers occurred on the island of
Cephalonia, part of the Greek Ionian islands, where the Italian Aqui Division was
stationed, commanded by General Antonio Gandin. After the Italian surrender to the
Allies, General Gandin received conflicting orders from his superiors. On September 8,
General Carlo Vecchiarelli, commander of Italian troops in Greece, ordered Gandin to
refrain from attacking the Germans if the Germans did not attack him. He issued no
directives in case of a German attack. On September 11, the Italian War Office in Rome
issued a decree that the Germans were to be treated as enemies. After a series of
negotiations between the local Italian and German commanders, Gandin and his men
decided to fight the Germans, but they were outgunned and outmanned by the Germans,
and without additional supplies they soon ran out of ammunition. Of the 12,000 Italian
soldiers stationed on Cephalonia, over 1,200 died in combat against the Germans, but
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over 5,000 were executed after they surrendered. Similar occurrences took place at other
Greek locations such as Kos and Corfu. 59
Italian soldiers on the peninsula were also massacred but in smaller numbers and
more sporadically. On September 10, 1943 at Nola, near Naples, two German
motorcycle soldiers tried to disarm Italian soldiers; when the Italians refused to surrender
the Germans opened fire on them. The Italians returned fire and killed one of the
German soldiers. The next day Italian soldiers sent a delegation to the German troops
stationed at Nola. Although the delegation waved the white flag in sign of surrender the
Germans opened fire killing one Italian. The next day they executed ten Italian officers. 60
A similar incident took place further south, in the region of Puglia, where the
Italian Ninth Armored Corps received orders from General Filippo Caruso to consider
German troops as the enemy and to react accordingly.

On September 11, two German

soldiers fell in an ambush and were killed. The German command sent 400 troops to
Barletta to search for the responsible parties. They entered the Office of the Traffic
Police and took 11 patrolmen and 2 street-sweepers, lined them up in front of the post
office and gunned them down in retaliation for the deaths of the two German soldiers.61
The reprisals of September 1943 frighteningly foreshadowed events to come, both
in Tuscany and in Italy as a whole. They were also instrumental in the recruitment of the
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Resistance. Within a couple of months, actions such as those in the Ionian Islands, Nola,
and Puglia would swell the ranks of the Partisans to as many as 25,000 as civilians and
former soldiers alike sought refuge in the woods and hills of Italy. German brutality
toward Italian military and civilians would continue to grow in ferocity and frequency as
the Allies pushed the Germans northward from Naples. The number of Resistance
fighters throughout Italy had grown to 80,000 by the time the main battle lines reached
Tuscany in the summer of 1944.62 There the familiar cycle of occupation, resistance and
reprisal would manifest itself repeatedly before the summer was through.

62

Brooks, 121.

45
CHAPTER 2
COMPONENTS OF THE RESISTANCE

The Italian nationals ho joined the Resistance movement can be divided into three
overlapping categories: the anti-Fascists who joined due to political ideology, the
common people tired of dictatorship who believed they were acting morally, and the
youth who were escaping conscription and probable transfer to the Russian front. Philip
Cooke simplifies the components of the Italian Resistance even further by dividing it in
two categories, the organized and spontaneous Resistance, with the organized being the
anti-Fascists, to include the Communists, and spontaneous being those who had
previously supported the Fascist regime.63

Politically motivated: Communists and left-wingers - backbone of the Resistance
movement?
There were four main strands of Italian left-wing Resistance to Fascism. The first
developed early (1925-1934) and was formed by left-wing liberals, excluding the
communist party, who formed an anti-Fascist concentration in France. In 1939,
following the Ethiopian and Spanish wars, the Italian Communist Party (PCI) emerged as
the strongest anti-Fascist group, although some members became disillusioned with
Russian communist ideology after the Nazi-Soviet pact of August 1939.

The

consolidated left-wing liberals formed the ―Lega Italiana dei Diritti dell‘Uomo‖ (Italian
League of Rights of Man) which operated out of Paris from 1924 through the Fascist
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years and sought to organize Italians in exile, stimulate Resistance, encourage clandestine
press, and offer aid to victims of Fascism. With the fall of the Fascist regime in 1943 the
final phase, the armed Resistance, finally began full-force.64
Several liberal organizations that were not affiliated with any particular political
movement formed following the rise of the totalitarian Fascist regime. In 1920 the
Circolo di Cultura, an apolitical social organization, was founded in Florence on a moral
impulse against Fascism. One of its most noted members was Carlo Rosselli, a socialist
who believed Italy would be ushered into a new renaissance which would embody a
democratic, socialist republic. He founded several anti-Fascist papers in Florence. Due
to increasing restrictions imposed by the Fascist regime, he fled first to Tunisia and
ultimately to France, where he continued his anti-Fascist work until 1937 when he was
assassinated by French Fascists.65
Benedetto Croce was another of the early non-communist liberal thinkers. He
was the Italian Minister of Education from 1920 to 1921 but was ousted from that
position by Mussolini‘s regime and replaced by Giovanni Gentile. Unlike many of his
counterparts, despite his objection to the current regime, Croce did not openly criticize
the Fascist regime and felt that open defiance at that time would be counterproductive.
He remained in Italy and was never arrested by the Fascists, probably due to his social
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status (he came from a wealthy and influential family), although he remained under
constant surveillance.66
Antonio Gramsci was influenced by the philosophy of Benedetto Croce as well as
that of Karl Marx. Originally part of the socialist party, he believed that Italian socialism
needed to emulate Lenin to succeed. In 1922 he traveled to Russia where he gained
political experience and established contacts and sponsorship for a united Italian
communist party. At the same time Mussolini was developing his totalitarian state and
abolishing all political parties except the Fascist.

Gramsci moved to Vienna to continue

his work on the development of the PCI, but in 1926 he was arrested by the Fascists and
remained imprisoned until 1934 when he was released due to poor health.67 He
influenced many Italian communists including Luigi Longo, one of his contemporaries
and a fellow co-founder of the PCI. Longo moved to France in 1922 to escape the Italian
Fascist Regime. After the fall of France he was arrested and turned over to the Italian
Fascists. He was released the day Mussolini was deposed from power. He immediately
joined a Partisan group and assumed command under the name ―Gallo.‖68
Many believe the Communists were the backbone of the Italian Resistance
movement because of their continued efforts to organize and network. As noted earlier,
Communists had taken the lead in work stoppages prior to the 45-day crisis. They were
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led by Luigi Longo, then head of the Communist Party. He had the financial and political
backing of the Soviet leaders and was an experienced organizer; he also had the
sympathy of the American Office of Strategic Services (OSS).
Although exact figures are still disputed, the A.N.P.I., Associazione Nazionale
Partigiani Italiani (the Italian National Association of Partisans) represents the
Communists as leaders of the most numerous Partisan brigades, comprising 38 percent of
the total Resistance, with the other 62 percent comprised of displaced Italian soldiers,
draft dodgers, escaped Allied POWs, other political anti-fascists, and otherwise common
citizens. Guido Quazza, estimates that only 10-15 percent of the Partisans were longterm political enemies of Fascism, while the remainder only developed opposition to
Fascism during the war.69

With little organization and overall networking the

Resistance was theoretically divided between those led by the Comitato di Liberazione
Nazionale (CLN) which replaced the Lega Italiana dei Diritti dell’Uomo, and those led
by the king. Since the king displayed little initiative in the struggle, he was not
recognized by many of the anti-Fascists.70
Political parties banned under Fascist rule continued to function clandestinely
during the dictatorship. With the fall of the Fascist regime the underground parties came
together to organize the Italian Resistance. The lack of communication between the
government and higher military officials and among the military hierarchy prompted the
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anti-Fascists to form the Comitato di Liberazione Nazionale (Committee of National
Liberation – CLN) which gave birth to organized Resistance.71 The CLN was formed in
Rome on September 9, 1943. The new organization comprised the Italian Communist
Party, the Italian Socialist Party, the Action Party (a republican liberal party), the
Christian Democrat Party (the Catholic party), the Labor Democrats, and the Liberals.
The organization was a coalition, but individual parties took control of specific Partisan
bands and placed party members as leaders of the Partisan groups. The three main
Partisan groups were the Garibaldi Brigades (Communist Party), Giustizia e Libertá
Brigades (Action Party), and the Matteotti Brigades (Socialist Party).72
Representatives of the Republican Party did not join the CLN due to their antimonarchical prejudices, but republicans did join the Resistance movement as
independents. Members of the far right, such as the Bandiera Rossa Roma; apoliticals,
such as Stella Rossa; and anarchists such as the Battaglione Lucetti participated in the
Resistance as independent units, wanting to fight for Italy‘s liberation but not associating
themselves with the CLN. The different political ideologies and organizations created
some discordance among the Partisan groups, and there were clashes between them. In
the interest of attaining the common goal, radical units tried to stay out of each other‘s
way. The first bands of resisters were formed by ex-soldiers and young men avoiding the
Fascist draft and were referred to as rebels by the occupying regime. With the creation of
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the CLN the Resistance became more organized and was eventually joined by many who
had no political motivations other than the ridding Italy of German domination.

Common people doing the decent thing: locals, women, and clergy.
The continued anti-Fascist underground network led by the left-wing kept the
hope of Resistance alive and somewhat organized and induced thousands of northern
factory workers to strike despite the totalitarian Fascist regime. Political ideology was
not the only motivation for the uprising of the civilian population. Italians were
disillusioned with the Fascist Regime and its delusions of grandeur; they wanted their
men back home, and a return to normalcy. One of the turning points for the common
people followed the Axis powers‘ defeat at Stalingrad when the Italian Supreme
Command issued a statement to the Italian people that the Germans had seized all
transportation, provisions and medicines, and abandoned the Italians to die.73
The act of betrayal by the Germans further convinced many Italians it was time to
withdraw from the conflict and start rebuilding their nation. Many had already begun a
passive Resistance to Fascism prior to its collapse in 1943. They would continue to
oppose the Germans and the RSI using moral courage and techniques to diffuse violence.
This allowed them to maintain a minimum quality of life and some degree of
independence.74 Passive Resistance progressed to active defiance spontaneously
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throughout Italy and ranged from small acts, such as not properly addressing a Fascist or
Nazi official, to open armed conflict.
The civilian population seemed to support the Resistance efforts in different ways.
Across the nation the most common act of support came from women who gave civilian
clothes and food to the resisters. The women had a natural network. They were the ones
who brought food and care to the relatives and the infirm, and they had a freedom of
movement not allowed to men. Unica Garemi Guelfi gives a detailed account of the
women‘s network in Pisa. 75 This freedom enabled them to act as ―mules‖ to transport
information, food, and weapons to refugees and Partisans. Many Italians attribute the
women‘s spontaneous acts of protection toward the refugees and Partisans to natural
maternal instincts and assume the women acted with kindness and nurture in the hope
that other women elsewhere would treat their husbands, sons, or brothers with the same
care. Giorgio Vecchiani, a Partisan and current director of the A.N.P.I. of Pisa disagrees
with the theory of maternal instinct as the reason for the women‘s participation in the
Resistance because there were also women who collaborated with the Nazis and
Fascists.76
Most clergy did not participate in armed Resistance or even the transport of
weapons but limited their participation to hiding, housing, feeding, clothing and simply
caring for those in need. The position of Pope Pius XII (Eugenio Pacelli) has been hotly

75

Unica Garemi Guelfi, ―Le donne nella resistenza,‖ in Resistenza ai giornin nostri (Pisa,
A.N.P.I., 2005), 112-115; Origo, 108.
76

Giorgio Vecchiani, interview by author, Pisa, Italy, June 11, 2008.

52
debated and Vatican documents of the era are not yet accessible to scholars. Opinions
vary from those who believe Pacelli was a racist and supporter of the Nazis, to those who
believe he secretly instructed the Church to help refugees. Giorgio Gariboldi supports
the belief that the Pope and Vatican did all they could to save innocent people from
persecution and that the Church was in a precarious position, where open opposition to
the regime would have resulted in loss of independent status for the Church. This would
have further limited the Church‘s ability to help the persecuted. John Cornwell took the
opposite stance and wrote a controversial book supporting the theory that Pope Pius XII
was a racist, who supported the Nazi cause and used the totalitarian regimes to promote
his climb in the church hierarchy.

A more neutral stance on the Vatican‘s position is

presented by Michael Marrus in his ―Understanding the Vatican During the Nazi
Period.‖77 At the lower level of the Church hierarchy, however, there can be little debate
that Church officials were actively engaged in acts of resistance. There, despite the
Papacy‘s official proclamation of neutrality and nonintervention in political matters, local
clergy participated in harboring Jews, Partisans and escaped prisoners of war.
The escaped Allied POWs.
During Rommel‘s victorious campaigns in North Africa, Italy became the
repository for Allied prisoners of war. By September 8, 1943 there were over 70,000
Allied POWs in Italy. When Italy quit the Axis many Italian prison guards deserted or
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released the prisoners. At prisons where the guards did not desert, the POWs took
advantage of the confusion among the Italian military and simply escaped. 78 With the
great exodus of Allied POWs from the prison camps in Italy, many Italians supported the
escaped prisoners in any way they could. Peasants and shepherds gave the escaped
prisoners civilian clothes to wear and hid them in the fields and hills. In return, the
escaped POWs helped with farming chores, relieving some of the shortage of manpower
suffered by the Italians. The wealthier people contributed monetarily toward the
clothing, housing, and feeding of the Allied escapees. Iris Origo gives many examples of
both peasant and wealthy contributors in her diary War in Val D’Orcia. The Germans
and Fascists tried to deter aid to the escaped POWs by placing a 1,800 lire price for each
POW and threatening anyone sheltering POWs with the death penalty.79
By mid-November 1943 the Germans transferred 24,000 Allied POWs from the
Italian camps to Germany. By May 1944, when the Allies broke the Gustav line at
Cassino, the Germans could no longer spare men to hunt down escaped POWs, and there
was a surge in Partisan numbers in the mountains of central and northern Italy. Many
escaped POWs seized the opportunity, and by early October nearly 6,500 made their way
to the Allied lines while over 4,000 reached Switzerland.80 The main goal of most POWs
was to rejoin Allied troops and resume the fight; however, the Allies did not have the
logistics in place to aid and absorb the escaped POWs. It was more advantageous to the
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Allies to have the escaped POWs remain behind enemy lines, join the Partisans, and
collect and deliver intelligence data for a more effective Allied coordinated effort.81
The Allied commands were slow in trusting the Partisans, partly because Italians
had previously been their enemies and partly because the Partisans did not trust the King
and Badoglio‘s government. At the very least many Partisans believed the king had
abdicated when he escaped to southern Italy and left the troops and civilian population to
fend for themselves. Other Partisans viewed the king and the marshal as out and out
deserters while the Allies recognized the two men as the only legitimate Italian
government. The Allies were also wary of the Italian army military intelligence service,
the Servizio Informazioni Militari (SIM) as Peter Tompkins, member of the OSS,
remembers: ―I had no faith in the professionals not only because of their record in the war
against us, but because I suspected and with good reasons they would invent large
portions of their intelligence.‖82
The United States initially dropped supplies and ammunition only to areas where
Partisans were led by Allied agents and started dropping supplies to other Partisan units
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only after the Italian Resistance had proven itself. In addition to the mistrust issue, initial
coordination between Allies and the Italian Resistance was unstable with no clear policy
for guidance. The British operations were directed by the No. 1 Special Force, part of
the Special Operations Executive (SOE), while the American operations were directed by
the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) which had a separate chain of command.83

Youth also swelled the ranks of the Partisans.
By the time Mussolini‘s puppet Saló Republic had been established on September
23, 1943 most of the Italian military had been disarmed, and what remained had largely
defected to the Allies. Mussolini nevertheless sought to reconstitute an armed force for
the new regime. There were no uniforms available, so the new conscripts wore civilian
clothing. Their commanders were Italian but it was clear to them from the start that the
Germans were in charge.84
By the beginning of 1944 there were Italian soldiers fighting alongside the
Germans on the Russian front, Italian soldiers in German-occupied Italy - the
repubblichini (Italian soldiers of the RSI) - imposing Fascist rule in Northern Italy, and
Italian soldiers fighting alongside the Allies in Southern Italy. In the battle of Anzio
there were Italian soldiers fighting on both sides. In addition to fighting foreign enemies
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(whether Axis or Allies) Italians were fighting each other in a civil war with the
republicans under Mussolini fighting the monarchists under King Emmanuel and Marshal
Badoglio. Adding to the confusion, there were Resistance fighters in the mountains of
central and northern Italy, the Partisans, fighting the Nazis and Fascists. Youth subject
to conscription in the RSI were faced with the prospect of joining the military and being
sent to the Russian front to fight alongside the Germans, stay in Italy and fight their own
countrymen, or risk the death penalty by escaping conscription and hiding out or joining
the Partisans.

The Resistance organizes
The Resistance movement was initially limited to passive responses to the
authorities in the form of work slow-downs, non-support of fascist activities, and
subversive leftist political discussions. In his book Quelli della Stella Rossa, Sirio
Ungherelli gives detailed accounts of how the Resistance networked under Fascism, from
recruitment to sleeper cells, and eventually armed conflict. In The Path to the Spider’s
Nests, Italo Calvino also describes how the GAP infiltrated the towns and cities and
recruited Partisans. In the early stages of Partisan development, the groups had a linear
chain of contact; one knew the name of his handler or coordinator and the name of the
person he handled but no additional names. This was for security; if a person was
arrested and tortured he had limited knowledge to divulge. When the Resistance assumed
a more active role, the organizational structure changed from linear to cellular where one
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knew the name of his handler as well as that of a small group of collaborators who
formed the cell.85
Partisan groups generally were located in the mountains and farmlands, while the
GAPs recruited, organized labor strikes, and coordinated logistics in the towns and cities.
Prior to the deposition of Mussolini and the 45-day crisis, the majority of the population
was discontented but not ready to actively participate in an actual Partisan war; however,
their temperament led them to aid in the Resistance activities once they started. The
dispersion of the Italian military, the alliance with the Allies and the Allied landings in
Italy were the catalysts for the organization of the Resistance movement.
A portion of the disbanded Italian military, without specific political affiliation
other than loyalty to the king and the ―recognized‖ government, started collecting arms
and ammunition immediately after the public announcement of surrender on September
8. They did not know exactly what the course of action would be, but were experienced
enough to expect a long struggle for the reunification and liberation of Italy. The military
were trained for combat; many had survived under extreme conditions and were prepared
to initiate a fight to free Italy of the German invaders. Numerous young civilians were
also prepared to join the military in the struggle to liberate Italy, but some military
leaders were convinced that war of any kind was strictly a matter for soldiers. This
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attitude, which permeated in the first months of Resistance organization, created a
―Resistance within the Resistance.‖86
The various political parties, which had been underground and illegal, started to
emerge out of their silence and hiding. They gave a sense of direction and purpose, but
most significantly a voice and visibility to the phenomenon of armed Resistance. On
September 9, with Rome already occupied by German forces, the CLN in Rome appealed
to all Italians to join the Resistance and fight to free Italy.

The CLN in Rome tried to

take command of the liberation movement but in fact it was the CLN in Milan which
would effectively assume control of the organization of the Resistance.87
Within the CLN there was division and controversy. The organization did not
effectively collect money, supplies and weapons until the spring and summer of 1944. In
the beginning it acted more as a government, dividing the different tasks in sectors,
organizing the military, financial, logistic, and propaganda departments. The two largest
political parties within the CLN, the Partito Comunista Italiano (PCI) and the Partito
D‘Azione (PDA), disagreed with the plans of action. The PCI called for systematic and
continued assaults on the Germans and Fascists which would serve as propaganda and
grow its ranks. Under the leadership of Luigi Longo, in October 1943 the PCI formed the
Garibaldi brigades. The PDA wanted to restructure the disbanded military and have a
volunteer ―patriotic‖ army that included volunteer civilians. Under the leadership of
Ferruccio Parri, the Giustizia e Liberta‘ brigades were formed. Parri became one of the
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leaders of the CLN and held the first negotiations with the Anglo-Americans who were
skeptical of dealing with a communist leader.88
Individual commanders at times opposed the mandates from the CLN and took
action independently.

Political cohesiveness did not always exist as some fighters

joined a particular Partisan group because of its geographical location rather than the
political affiliation. The individual groups morphed continually, splitting and creating
new groups with different names and under different commands. The schisms were due
to a myriad of reasons and not limited to political controversy. Confusion also permeated
the government. Fascists who had been in charge were now taking orders from the
Germans. Those who felt a continued loyalty to Mussolini and the Fascist dream had to
feel betrayed by their former German allies and their fellow countrymen who followed
Badoglio. Adding to the disorder, separate groups of Fascists and Partisans took
advantage of the pandemonium to impose their rule and take advantage of the local
population. Many personal vendettas took place and an anarchical atmosphere prevailed.
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CHAPTER 3
RESISTANCE IN TUSCANY

With the exception of the Po Valley to the north and the Puglia region in the south
(the heel of the boot), Italy is a predominately mountainous country. The Alps crown the
country in the north and range in altitude between 13,000 and 15,000 feet. The Apennine
Mountains form the backbone of the country, running from the Liguria region down to
the toe of the boot in Calabria and range in altitude between 7,000 and 9,000 feet. The
region of Tuscany is situated on the northwestern coast of Italy just north of the Lazio
region and Rome. There is flat land where the Arno River flows out to the Tyrrhenian
Sea and some flat land along the coast, but the majority of the region is comprised of
rolling hills and mountains which range from the Apuan Alps in the north to the
Apennines in the east. The metalliferous hills encompass the heart of the region and
cover the area of Livorno, Pisa, Siena, and Grosseto. The locale is peppered with silver,
copper, lead, and pyrite mines which have been exploited since the time of the Etruscans.
The area also includes extensive cave systems which offer shelter and hiding places.
During the mid-twentieth century there were extensive roads and rail-lines along
the coast; but further inland, the roads diminished as the terrain got rougher.
Consequently, travel to and between small hill and mountain towns was neither easy nor
fast. The relative isolation of the towns regularly promoted some autonomy but also left
the local authorities with unsupervised power over the local population. The political
ambition of the authority in charge often determined the severity or laxity of control over
the citizens. In some locations the local carabinieri were only concerned with
maintaining the law and let the people live and run their lives independently. In other
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locations the local Fascist authorities exercised extreme control over the population and
used their power for personal gain and vendettas. Consequently, the elements of
Resistance in Tuscany developed according to the particular history of each area.89
The overall Resistance in Tuscany went through two distinct phases. Its
membership initially consisted of remnants of the Italian dispersed military, fugitive
Allied POWs and others who were interested in escaping Nazi and Fascist round-ups,
civilians who were openly defying Fascist policies, and of course, the members of the
political left who had been building a network for subversive activities. Initial Resistance
activities also reflected this variegated make-up of fighters. From September 1943 until
early summer 1944, Resistance fighters concentrated on expanding their own numbers,
assisting fugitives (Jews, POWs, and draft evaders), coordinating work slow-downs and
strikes, building an infrastructure, and harassing the local Fascist officials. The Tuscan
Resistance generally avoided open engagements with larger Axis units, particularly with
the Germans. The second phase started in early summer 1944, with the Allies fighting
their way north through Tuscany, and the Germans intensifying their defenses in an
attempt to slow down the Allied advances. With open conflict now in Tuscan territory,
and the Partisans better organized and equipped, they coordinated their efforts with the
Allies. Resistance fighters began sabotaging German equipment and taking an active role
in the fight against the Nazis and Fascists.

89

The ranges of local authority in small towns are well documented throughout Origo, War in Val
D’Orcia and in Tullio Bruno Bertini, Trapped in Tuscany: Liberated by the Buffalo Soldiers (Boston:
Dante University Press, 1998).

62
Conditions in Tuscany mirrored the confusion at the national level. Mario
Chirici, a republican, split from his Partisan cell in Istria, Croatia, to return to Tuscany
and the area of Massa Marittima on the Tuscan coast. He formed several groups, starting
with the Massetano band, which became the 10th company Guardia Nazionale Giuseppe
Garibaldi and later grew into the 3rd Garibaldi Brigade. His groups were backed by the
Communists from the CLN in Livorno, but he welcomed people of all political
affiliations as long as they shared anti-fascist ideology. The CLN, however, pushed
political cohesiveness. After the February 16, 1944 battle between the 3rd Garibaldi
Brigade and the Fascists, which resulted in defeat of the Partisan group, the CLN backed
the formation of a separate group, the Boscaglia Brigade, which welcomed those of
different political affiliations and was the unit that Aroldo Salvadori later joined.90
Between the fall of 1943 and spring 1944 the Partisan formations in central Italy
carried out some acts of sabotage but failed to involve significant numbers of the civilian
population. The Communist Party coordinated with the CLN, and on March 1, 1944,
every factory in Northern Italy ceased production at the same time. The Italians were
protesting the German deportation of Italian workers, equipment, and raw materials.
Two days later GAP organizers in Tuscany received the orders, and local factory workers
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and miners began to strike. This was the first successful nationwide protest since the
installation of Fascism two decades earlier.91
The Germans faced a problem in ascertaining jurisdiction over the civilian
population in Italy with rivalry between the Schutzstaffel (SS – Nazi Party formations
which had both police and, by 1944, military functions) and the regular army. Hitler
resolved this in favor of Field Marshal Albert Kesselring‘s regular army forces.

The SS

and police would remain responsible for the operations against civilians but under
Kesselring‘s direction. By spring 1944 Field Marshal Kesselring was feeling the
increasing impact of the Resistance movement as recorded in his diary, A Soldier’s
Record.92 Added to his frustration was the fact that the Partisans did not wear
distinguishing signs or uniforms while carrying out their acts of sabotage and then either
retreated to the mountains or within the local population. In addition, many civilians
were helping the Partisans in various ways, either voluntarily or through compulsion,
which made them equally responsible (in the eyes of occupation authorities) for Axis
casualties and for subsequent repercussions. In response, Kesselring issued the so called
―impunity clause,‖ not as an act of reprisal but as punishment against the bandits that in
his opinion violated international law and contradicted every principle of clean soldierly
fighting. Emphasizing the German actions as punishment for crimes rather than arbitrary
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reprisals was supposed to lend them legitimacy as defenders of order rather than brutes
flexing their muscles.93
When Italy capitulated to the Allies, Germany was forced to reorganize its
military and transfer potentially essential troops from the Eastern and Western Fronts to
Italy. The otherwise orderly and well-organized German armed forces went from
fighting a well-defined enemy (in the Allies or occupied peoples) to suddenly fighting a
prior ally. Furthermore, the fights did not necessarily follow conventional rules of
warfare as the Germans found themselves fighting Partisan guerrilla tactics. The Partisan
bands started out small, sporadic, and with little organization, but after the fall and winter
of 1943 the Resistance gained in numbers and momentum, and started coordinating their
attacks and acts of sabotage with Allied military advances.94

One man’s story: Aroldo Salvadori.
The experiences of Aroldo Salvadori dramatically illustrate the early patterns of
development of the Resistance in Tuscany.95 They show the link of the Gruppi di Azione
Patriottica – GAP (groups for patriotic action, the military arm of the Communist Party)
network with the dispersed resisters, the initial logistic problems, and the issues of trust
and loyalty. Aroldo Salvadori lived in a small village of Berignone in the province of
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Pisa, Tuscany. He was seventeen years old and had already passed his physical
examination for entry into the military on the fateful date of September 8, 1943.
Tuscany was under German occupation, and after Mussolini was restored to power by the
Germans he lowered the age of conscription in an attempt to rebuild his Italian army.
Aroldo‘s parents encouraged him to escape since nobody really knew who was in charge
of the national government, and locally the Fascists were flexing their muscles. They
feared if he joined the army he would be sent to the Russian Front to fight with the
Germans.
In early spring 1944 the carabinieri of the town conducted a ―raking,‖ looking for
eligible young boys for conscription. When Aroldo could not be found, the Carabinieri
arrested his father for failing to turn in his son.96 Aroldo remained hidden for two weeks
but could not handle the guilt over his father‘s arrest. With his father in prison there was
nobody to protect the family or earn a living, and he believed the Fascists would continue
to harass his mother and siblings. He was offered amnesty to turn himself in, which he
did.97 He was escorted to Pisa, the nearest large city, and was brought to the police
station where he was interrogated for hours.
During the interrogation he was asked what he had in his sack. His mother had
packed three breads, some sausage and cheese. The interrogator left the room and upon
his return he told Aroldo that in exchange for his sack of food Aroldo would be allowed a
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fifteen-day leave to settle his affairs prior to going in the army. Aroldo did not know if
this was a trick but had no choice but to trust the guard. He knew that the soldiers and
city people were suffering from hunger so he agreed to the exchange.

The guard left the

holding room, and when he returned he handed Aroldo an official document ordering him
to present himself to the military center in Florence from where he would be sent to a
cavalry unit stationed at Cassino, southern Italy. He gave him permissive leave and a
fifteen-day pass to go home prior to reporting to the transition unit in Florence.98
When Aroldo exited the prison he did not know which direction to take. He had
never been in the city and was going to walk home but did not know where to go. He
was standing on the sidewalk, looking lost, when an older gentleman asked him what he
was doing. Aroldo immediately told him he wasn‘t escaping but had legal documents
allowing him to go home. The older gentleman walked him to the bus station so he could
ride the bus to Pomarance, the province closest to his home town. The bus driver
recognized Aroldo as the young man who had previously been accompanied to Pisa by
two military guards and assumed he had escaped.

He told him to hide in the luggage

compartment on the top of the bus. Aroldo remained in the luggage compartment for the
entire trip, approximately ninety kilometers, and then ran to his home village.
He found his home full of neighbors who had come to console his family after his
departure. They thought he had escaped again, but he showed them his military pass and
they all celebrated his return home. When the celebrations subsided and the time to
report back to the military was nearing the townspeople spoke to him about what would
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happen if he returned to the military. The Allies had been fighting the Germans for
control of Monte Cassino for months and casualties were high. It was only a matter of
time before the Allied forces prevailed. If Aroldo was not sent to the cavalry unit in
Cassino he would end up fighting for the Germans in a foreign land, when he could be
protecting his own territory at home fighting the Nazis.
This council was persuasive to the young boy. Along with two other young men
from his home town, with whom he had grown up, he started to look for hiding places
and escape routes in the woods surrounding the town. The three friends decided to hide
out and not report for duty when their time was up. At the end of the fifteen days the
carabinieri started harassing Aroldo‘s father because Aroldo had not returned to duty.
His father was able to stay out of trouble by stating that he made Aroldo present himself
to the army; if he had escaped after that, the father was not responsible and did not know
where his son was. This tactic was widespread: it cleared the parents of any
responsibility for the deserting son so that the government did not withhold their food
vouchers or imprison the parent.99
The three boys went to the woods to hide out. They had each packed a blanket
and a few extra pairs of socks, and they had one rabbit to cook. When they reached a
cabin along the Cecina River they thought they would be safe and started to cook the
rabbit. Just across the river there was a large ammunition depot belonging to the Italian
navy. There were some workers and some Italian and German soldiers. Suddenly the
boys heard three shots ring through the air and they abandoned their food and escaped
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further into the woods. They came upon a farmer‘s house and asked for shelter. After
they told the farmer their story, he agreed to let them stay but did not want them in the
house for fear of punishment if they were found. He told them to hide in the stable and
he would bring them food. They spend the night in the stable sleeping in the food trough
and left the following morning.
They went to the hills where a coalman lived with his wife and son who had
escaped service with the carabinieri. After a few days a man they had seen in their town
from time to time, and who was known only as ―the merchant‖ came to the coalman.
The merchant was known to associate with everybody and had even been seen playing
cards with the forest rangers, who were Fascists, so they were afraid he would turn them
in. Instead he approached them, showed them his handgun, and told them he was trying
to organize a group to resist the Nazis/Fascists when the time came and to try to protect
their families. He asked them to join him and stated that if they just continued to hide out
or return to their village they would eventually get caught and killed. At that time the
boys had not even heard of the CLN, as only higher-ranking organizers were in direct
contact with the Resistance organization.

The merchant told them their task was going

to be building huts on the mountain where they could observe military movements below,
collect information to pass on, and receive instructions. He was not familiar with the
territory and needed someone from the area.
Aroldo and his companions built six huts on the side of the mountain where they
had a good view of the ammunition depot, the main road, and could observe military
movements. Once the huts were built, Partisans started arriving and joining them. The
merchant continued bringing in men who were part of the Resistance movement. In little
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time there were at least thirty Partisans in the group. Food was supplied to them by the
CLN in the form of sacks of corn flour so they could make polenta. They were
instructed not to make fires during the day because they would be easily spotted, but
could make small fires at night so they could cook. Instead of using wood they used a
little charcoal which made a more contained fire. The CLN would bring sacks of grain to
a particular farmer, who in turn would bring the grain to the local mill to be ground into
flour. The mill was approximately seven kilometers from the Partisan hideout. Aroldo
and three other men would walk to the mill at night to collect their sacks of flour and
make their way back to their hideouts in the dark.
With the hideouts built and the food supply arranged, it was time to arm
themselves. The initial weapons inventory was totally inadequate for a group of thirty
Partisans who had a total of three revolvers, a couple of hunting rifles, and three muskets
of questionable value. The CLN, however, managed to collect arms and ammunition
from the disbanded Italian military and distributed the weapons to their organized groups.
Aroldo‘s detachment, now called ―La Prima Squadra di Berignone,‖ was supplied by
their CLN organizers in Pisa who hid weapons and ammunition on a horse-drawn cart
covered with cauliflower. The cart was brought to the same mill where the Partisans got
their flour. At one point, when going through the town before the mill, the horse could
not pull the wagon up an incline in the town. Townspeople surrounded the wagon and
were trying to buy the cauliflower stating they were hungry. The driver pleaded with
them to leave the vegetables alone because he was committed to deliver them elsewhere.
To maintain order in the town, the local fascists helped push the wagon up the hill so the
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driver could proceed on his route. The irony of their action has been a bragging matter
for many years.100
The salvaged weapons were not all new World War II models; the rifle assigned
to Aroldo was an old World War I 91-model gun. However, there were also some Breda
machine-guns in load. With the Partisan group adequately armed, they were able to start
aggravating the local Nazis and Fascists. The local fascists and Carabinieri had been
harassing the local civilians with their ronde (military patrols) looking for deserters and
escapees. By the end of 1943 the Partisans were sufficiently organized and equipped to
begin their campaign to curb Fascist action. The Partisans were not supposed to act on
their own but await orders by the CLN regarding what actions to take, where, and when.
Normally their attacks on the Fascists, Carabinieri, or Nazis were in response to the
former either sequestering people or taking goods from the civilians. With scarcity of
food already a problem even among the farmers, the requisitioning of grain or livestock
in any amount added to the suffering of the civilians. It was the Partisans‘ responsibility
to protect the people.
Aroldo‘s Partisan squadron received their orders from the CLN in Massa
Marittima. The CLN had received numerous reports of Fascists abusing the local
population in a town called Montieri where several civilians had been beaten or
imprisoned by the local authorities. In coordination with other Partisan squadrons, who
patrolled the streets leading to town in the event of German interference, Aroldo‘s group
cut telephone lines and bombed both the power station and the Carabinieri headquarters.
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The Germans did break through the Partisan lines, and the squadron received orders to
retreat. Aroldo had been temporarily deafened by the sound of the bombs and did not
hear the order. He nevertheless made his escape along with another Partisan through the
cemetery.

They managed to find their way back to their hideout and were put on guard

duty, assigned to the big machine gun. During the night they heard noises, demanded
identification, and when they received no response, they began firing.

When the rest of

the Partisans heard the commotion, they also began shooting and some sparks ignited the
straw on the bedding. A fire developed from the ignited straw and reached their
ammunition pile which caught fire and blew up.
It was obvious their camp was no longer a safe place since the fire and explosions
could be seen and heard from a great distance. They quickly discovered their leader had
betrayed them and given their location to the Fascists.

At this point, the second-in-

command took charge and gave them the choice to either disband and try to make it on
their own, or follow him. Out of the thirty men, twenty-five went with the new
commander, while the others, including Aroldo went on their own. Aroldo hid out in
caves near his home. As it turned out, the new commander turned in his twenty-five
men for a bounty. There were summarily executed in the town of Cecina. When Aroldo
found out what happened to his companions, he went back to the woods, up the
mountains of Carline in the province of Siena, and joined one of the local Garibaldi
squadrons, nicknamed after Guido Boscaglia, a Partisan who was wounded, captured by
the Germans, tortured, and beaten to death when he refused to give the names and
location of his companions.
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When Aroldo reached the 23rd Garibaldi squadron, they did not know who he
was. They apologized to him for the treatment he was about to receive but they needed to
be sure he was not a spy. Their leader, a man named Bargagna, who was from Pisa,
gave him a piece of bread and some water and locked him in a hut. They would keep him
locked up until they could verify his identity and affiliations. Aroldo knew he was at
great risk because if he could not prove his identity and the fact that he was a genuine
Partisan they would kill them. The Partisans could not take any chances of betrayal, and
if in doubt they would err on the side of safety. There was no pity; the life of one was
not worth risking the squadron.
Aroldo lucked out, one day and a half after his capture a courier arrived. Aroldo
knew the man who was from his same town of Berignone. The courier vouched for him,
and Aroldo joined the squadron. His group was comprised of seventeen people and was
led by a man named Leone. Aroldo became the cook for the squadron and a person they
counted on for his knowledge of the area. Aroldo was given the code name Guerra (war)
and a Sten machine gun. Although he was the cook, he often was used as courier. He
eventually received better arms, but when faced with enemy fire, fear was always present.
By this time the Allies began parachuting materiel to the Partisans so they could
help in the liberation of Italy. These drops included radios, ammunitions and supplies.
The Americans also dropped food supplies, canned meats, beans, chocolate, blankets
clothes and shoes, a real treat for men who had been cold and hungry for months. The
Partisans were now fully armed, well fed, and were in position to effectively execute the
orders they received from the Allies via radio. In June 1944 the Allies informed the
Partisans that the Germans were emptying the grain silos and oil containers in the town of
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Radicondoli, province of Siena, to transfer the food and fuel to Germany and leaving the
Italians to starve. Aroldo‘s squadron went to the town of Radicondoli, surrounded the
town and began a battle with the Carabinieri. The Partisans took control of the town,
opened the silos, and distributed the grain to whomever wanted it. Townspeople and
farmers got their fill of grain.
The Fascists stationed in the city of Siena were apprised of the situation and
headed to the town of Radicondoli to force the townspeople to return the grain. The
Partisans were again alerted to the pending Fascist counteraction and returned to the
town. They took over the town and successfully defended it against the Fascists. They
remained in the town for the following three weeks to defend it against any Fascist
reprisals.

After about twenty days they spotted a German tank and foot soldiers headed

toward the town. The Partisan commander gave the order to retreat into the woods
because the Germans were retreating north and would only be passing through. He did
not want a confrontation between the Partisans and Germans with a possible reprisal
against the civilian population. The Partisans went into the mountains but over the next
couple of days American bombers attacked the area. When the Partisans descended the
mountain into the nearest town they found the Americans. The Partisans led the Allies to
the town of Radicondoli and remained there to defend the population against any
remaining Fascists in the area.
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CHAPTER 4
RESISTANCE AND REPRISALS: THE BLOODY SUMMER OF 1944 IN TUSCANY

In May 1944 Allied forces at last broke through the Gustav Line at Cassino. At
the same time British and American forces broke out of their narrow enclave at Anzio
and began an offensive that would carry them to Rome and northward. With the fall of
Cassino and the Gustav Line to the Allies, the Germans built several lines of defense on
their retreat northward (Caesar Line, Albert Line, Heinrich Line), but their stronghold
was to be the Gothic Line which went from the northern tip of Tuscany (near Carrara) on
the Tyrrhenian Sea, eastward across the Apennine Mountains to the Adriatic Sea.

In an

effort to slow the Allied advances, Kesselring ordered maximum destruction of bridges,
roads, tunnels, power stations, ports, and virtually anything else that would facilitate the
Allied advance. He proposed applying the scorched-earth tactics to the city of Rome but
on June 3rd, 1944 he received orders from the Führer that Rome was not to be
destroyed.101 By the time the Germans were forced to retreat to Tuscany, their aim was
not to defeat the Allies or even hold their position in central Italy but to slow down the
advance of the Allies. Likewise, after the fall of Rome, the Allied push up the Italian
peninsula slowed down. The Allied principal task in Italy was not necessarily to gain
ground but to engage and contain the greatest number possible of Germans which would
weaken their more essential forces in France and on the Eastern Front.102
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By the end of May 1944 both the Germans and the Allies dropped leaflets in
Tuscany. The Germans warned of severe punishments for anyone aiding Partisans or
Allied POWs, punishments which included confiscation of food and cattle, burning of
homes, and executions. At the same time the Allies urged the Italians to dodge their
country‘s draft into the RSI Army and aid the Partisans in their acts of sabotage against
the Germans. On June 7, General Harold Alexander sent radio messages encouraging the
Italian Resistance to take action and kill Germans.103 The Partisans increased their acts
of sabotage and harassment while the German army was being pushed further north by
the Allied advances. At the same time, the Germans knew of the Allies‘ constant airraids over Germany and had the added concern for the safety of their own families. By
June 1944 the Germans had been under constant stress of retreat and skirmishes. Their
resentment toward the Italians for switching sides, the increased Partisan activity, and
Kesselring‘s orders sparked a spontaneous increase in violence toward the civilian
population, and the looting of food, transportation and money.104 No one was safe. In the
region of Tuscany 65 priests in separate instances were arrested, tortured and killed for
aiding Partisans, prisoners of war (POWs), and Jews.105
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German retaliation for acts of defiance.
By the time the war came to Tuscany in the summer of 1944, the German army
had already developed a reputation for unbridled ferocity when it came to dealing with
acts of resistance. Some of the first spontaneous acts of open defiance toward the
Germans on the part of the civilian population took place in the city of Naples on
September 28, 1943. With no formal organization and guided solely by their reckless
optimism, the Neapolitan youths slashed tires and fouled the fuel lines of German
vehicles, set fires to military stores and fuel dumps, and attacked individual German
soldiers and took their weapons. Their guerrilla warfare techniques spread and became
the standard tactics of the Partisans.106 In retaliation for this defiance and to deny Allies
the resources of the city when the Germans evacuated it, the Germans destroyed the
city‘s aqueducts and sewer lines, destroyed generators and electrical systems, destroyed
the civilian transportation system, cut telephone lines, razed hotels, demolished flour
mills, looted the hospitals and stores, burned the University of Naples and all its contents,
and opened prisons to release dangerous criminals into the population. In two months
(September and October 1943) the Germans killed almost 1,600 people in the region of
Campania, of which over 600 lived in the city of Naples. 107
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Minor acts of sabotage followed but several months later a pivotal occurrence set
a chain of events in motion. On 23 March 1944, members of the GAP in Rome set off a
bomb that killed 32 German soldiers. Hitler authorized a reprisal for the attack and the
execution of ten Italians for each German killed. Herbert Kappler, German commander
of the Security Police in Rome, rounded up three-hundred fifty Italians. The hostages
included ordinary civilians, Jews from the local community, Italian prisoners of war,
previously captured Partisans, and some inmates from Roman prisons. The victims were
taken to the Ardeatine caves where they were executed. German military engineers set
explosives to seal the caves and bury the piles of bodies.108
Although there had been previous sporadic Partisan activity, it was the Rome
incident that forced the Germans to consider the Italian Resistance a real threat to the
German command. On April 7, 1944, Kesselring proclaimed to his armies that in dealing
with the Resistance excessively drastic measures taken by his own forces should never be
punished. As Resistance activity increased, Kesselring responded by issuing a second
order on June 17, 1944 which guaranteed immunity for the commanders who adopted
excessive methods in fighting the Partisans. In the ―impunity clause‖ Kesselring
communicated that ―the fight against the Partisans must be fought with all means at our
disposition and with increased severity. I will protect those commanders who exceed in
their methods of fighting the Partisans.‖109 Nowhere was this increased ferocity more
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evident than in Tuscany, the region most affected by German retaliations against the
civilian population as repercussion for Partisan activity. In Tuscany there were 229
episodes of massacres with over 3,800 victims, mostly males. Of those massacres, 204
were carried out by German troops, but only 38 (18.6 percent) were committed as
reprisals for Partisan actions, so a large number of murders were committed as acts of
retribution for disobeying orders, racial discrimination or other causes not connected to
Partisan activities.110
Atrocities in Tuscany
Aroldo Salvadori‘s experiences reflect the dilemma that many youths faced at the
time. He joined the geographically closest group that would accept and train him. Even
with its political disunity, the Resistance movement offered some order and protection for
young men who otherwise did not know whom to trust.111 Training the Resistance was
one thing; finding the physical means with which to resist was quite another. Weapons
and ammunition were scarce, and initially many raids on Nazi and Fascist installations
were undertaken simply to steal the necessary armaments. Due in part to a shortage of
weapons, some of those who escaped conscription were never directly involved in
fighting but restricted their participation to collecting food and clothes, cooking, or
gathering wood.112
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Aroldo started out as a cook for his Partisan group, but as the fighting increased
and came to his camp, he found himself forced to fight in self-defense. As the Allies got
nearer and hope for ending the war grew, he actively harassed and fought the Germans
and the Fascists.113 Others embraced combat more enthusiastically out of desperation to
expel the dictatorial regime and gain some control over their lives. Whether they became
attendisti (those who waited), or actively fought against the Nazis and Fascists, they at
least remained within their own country and justified their actions as protecting their
families and territory.
The Fascists‘ tyranny against the local populations became even more severe
when the Germans created Mussolini‘s puppet government and imposed stricter demands
on the Italians. The Fascist local commanders took revenge on any locals who had
defied them during Italy‘s recent 45-day crisis. Even the ―moderate‖ Fascists became
more militant in an attempt to appease the Germans and maintain their positions of
control. The Fascists and Germans struggled to maintain control over the population, and
with the ever-advancing Allied forces the Partisan movement erupted.
The Italians were well aware the Germans had adopted the scorched-earth policy.
In an attempt to preserve their livelihood and natural resources, the miners of Niccioletta
started to hide machinery, tools, explosives and provisions. The Partisan 23rd Garibaldi
Brigade had been operating in the area and on June 3, 1944, sent a detachment into the
town to help organize their Resistance.

The townspeople did not consider the local

Fascists dangerous, so they were only loosely guarded. Consequently, the wives of some
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of the Fascists managed to escape the guards and contact the Fascist command in the next
town. Meanwhile the Partisans had organized the miners in shifts to guard the mines,
equipment and local Fascists, then left the town.
On June 13, over three hundred German and Fascist soldiers surrounded
Niccioletta. They found a list with the names of the miners assigned to guard the mine
and equipment and arrested all those named. In addition to the seventy-seven miners on
the list, they arrested locals suspected of being Partisans or sympathizers, and transferred
one hundred fifty men to the town of Castelnuovo, over 50 miles northward, supposedly
for forced labor at the geothermic station. At Castelnuovo the prisoners were confined in
the local theater. The following morning they were divided in three groups, the first to
be executed, the second for deportation, and the third to be sent back home. The
Partisans and miners listed to guard the mines were chosen for execution. The rest were
divided by age; the young were deported, the old sent home. The III PolizeiFreiwillingen-Bataillon Italien, the Italian voluntary SS serving directly in the German
army executed seventy-seven men for their involvement in the Resistance movement.114
In the province of Arezzo, in the southeastern part of Tuscany, several towns were
subjected to Nazi-Fascist atrocities as reprisals for Partisan activity. On June 18, 1944, in
the town of Civitella a group of Partisans of the Renzino Band attacked four Germans
soldiers to get their weapons. They killed two of the Germans, wounded one, and one
escaped. The townspeople hid in the woods immediately after the attack on the Germans
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for fear of retaliation but no immediate action was taken. The local priest convinced
most of the townspeople to return since the German commander had assured him there
would be no repercussions since the Germans killed the responsible Partisans in a
firefight.115
The Germans entered the town on the morning of June 29th. The only
townspeople to run off to the fields were the draft-dodgers trying to escape capture. The
rest of the civilians felt sure of their safety as guaranteed by the German commander.
The Germans gathered the civilians and marched them through town. The women and
children were sent out of town while the men were assembled in the piazza and were
executed in rows of five. The Germans then brought out the machine guns and placed
them on the bridge at the bottom of the town and began to shoot indiscriminately, killing
civilians, and to set many houses on fire. The Germans then went to two nearby towns
and massacred additional men. In all 244 men were executed: 115 in Civitella, 58 in
Cornia, and 71 in San Pancrazio.116
Less than one month later, on July 16, 1944 in the nearby town of San Polo, 48
civilian men were murdered in an act of retaliation. A German deserter, caught by the
Nazis, revealed that German soldiers had been captured by local Partisans. Fascist and
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German SS units commanded by Marshall Hans Plumer rounded up sixty-five civilians,
including women and children. After torture and interrogations, they were forced to dig
three pit graves. The captives were then thrown in alive. The Partisans were placed in
the pits with their heads above ground and with explosive charges attached to their
bodies. They were then blown apart. The local priest requested permission to give the
victims a proper burial but his request was refused by the Germans because the victims
were ―people without honor.‖ Two days later the Allies arrived on location and were
informed of the atrocities. Two Italian doctors, Aldo Martini and Carlo Silli, supervised
the exhumation of the bodies from the mass graves on July 17 and 18, 1944 at the request
of the local parish priests. They found evidence that many of the men had been beaten,
all were in civilian clothes, and none had traces of wounds from a weapon indicating they
were buried alive. 117
The most notorious German massacre on the civilian population in Tuscany was
the massacre at Sant‘Anna di Stazzema in the province of Lucca.118 The Germans had
imposed an order for civilians in the area to evacuate to the city of Parma, across the
Apennine mountains. Hundreds of the displaced from the surrounding valley took
refuge in the hill town of Sant‘Anna di Stazzema quadrupling its population. On July
30, there was a fight between the 10th Garibaldi brigade and the Nazis which resulted in a
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German withdrawal. On August 5th the Germans posted 24-hour notices of evacuation in
the town, but the Partisan band Bardelloni posted notices on top of these that told the
population not to evacuate and that they would protect them. On August 12, 1944,
Evelina Berretti Pieri was in labor with her third child. She asked her neighbor to call the
midwife but Anton Galler, captain of the German SS, showed up instead. He slashed
Evelina‘s abdomen, pulled out the child, and then killed both mother and child who were
still attached by the umbilical cord.119 What followed was a four-hour massacre. The
civilians had been caught by surprise. Not only was the town high in the hills, but the
Partisans had promised their protection. Major Walter Reder , of the German 16th SS
Panzergrenadier-Division, commanded the troops involved in the massacre. Over 560
civilians, including women and children, were killed that morning. After the bloodbath
the town was torched.
It is still debated whether the Sant‘Anna massacre was a retaliation for Partisan
activity or simply a random act of terrorism by the retreating German army. In the
immediate period after the war, most remaining locals blamed the Partisans for the act of
German retaliation. There was some debate regarding a German posted order of
evacuation that the Partisans removed and replaced with their order to remain. The antiPartisan sentiment lasted until 1955 when the town of Sant‘Anna received the medal of
military valor which transformed the location into a symbol of the Resistance. Court
cases followed, and in 2007 the Cassation Court in Rome ruled the massacre not a
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reprisal but a premeditated act of terrorism. However, even after this final ruling, many
locals still privately blame the Partisans for bringing the tragedy to their town.120
The Germans continued their carnage in neighboring towns as they retreated
further north. On August 20, 1944, at Bardine San Terenzo in the province of Massa, in
retaliation for additional Partisan activity which killed a German colonel and his driver,
53 people were tied to posts or vehicles and shot. Reprisals continued for the next four
days, and a total of 369 people, mostly women and children, were killed; in addition, 454
houses were totally destroyed in a frenzied vengeance by the SS, led once again by Major
Walter Reder.121
The atrocities were not committed only by the Germans. After a meeting on
August 24, 1944 between Major Reder and Italian Colonel Giulio Lodovici, vicecommander of the Black Brigades, one hundred Italian Republican troops took over
―cleaning up‖ the problem area of Vinca in the province of Carrara. As a continuation of
round-ups for Partisan activity and support for the Resistance in the Massa-Carrara area
almost two hundred women, children, and elderly were executed, bringing the total
civilians massacred in the area to over five-hundred in a four-day period.122
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Florence, the political turning point
On June 4, 1944, Rome was liberated by the Allies without the participation of
the Italian Resistance. That defining event prompted the CLN to launch a massive
propaganda campaign to incite Italians to actively participate in the liberation of their
own country instead of having to be rescued by foreigners. The Germans were pushed
further north into Tuscany by the Allies, and between June and August 1944 the civilian
involvement in the Resistance increased exponentially. The Partisans participated in acts
of sabotage, harassed local Fascist officials, collected and passed information to the
Allies, and clashed with the Germans. The Germans had imposed a scorched-earth
campaign during their forced retreat north but Florence had been declared an ―open city,‖
a city declared demilitarized during war, so under international law, gained immunity
from attack. Doctor Gerhard Wolf, German Consul of Florence, convinced the German
ambassador in Italy to declare Florence an open city in an attempt to save the local art
and architecture.123 On July 28, 1944, the Germans issued the order to the Florentine
people to evacuate the city. The following day the RAF dropped leaflets, and the BBC
instructed the citizens of Florence to stand united and prevent the destruction of bridges
and other vital installations.124
Many citizens barricaded themselves and refused to leave their city. The
Partisans offered to show the Allies a way into the city through the sewer systems but the
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Allies turned down the option. The Resistance fighters made extensive use of the sewer
system to infiltrate Florence and carry out subversive activities. They used them as a
conduit to bring wounded Partisans to the city hospital and back out when they had
recovered. The hospital staff hid Partisans and escaped POWs in a quarantine ward so
the Germans and Fascists would not enter. Eventually an informer notified the Germans
of the Partisans‘ use of the sewers, and on August 24, the Germans blew them up to close
them off and prevent further use.125
There had been sporadic Partisan combat activity in the Florentine city since the
capitulation of the Italian government on September 8; however, it was the continued
networking of the GAP and the flow of information via Radio Cora that made the most
impact. Radio Cora, subventioned by the Partito d‘Azione, was used to maintain contact
between the Allies and the Resistance. It fed intelligence reports to the Allies, and was
used by the Resistance to direct Allied supply drops where needed.126
By August 4, the Allies had reached the outskirts of Florence but were unable to
enter the city. The Comitato Toscano di Liberazione Nazionale (CTLN) in Tuscany
gave the order for a general insurrection, and the citizens and Partisans fought to
eliminate the control of the Fascists over the last pockets of the city. The CTLN called in
the combat Partisan units from the surrounding areas and on August 11th the Florentines
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were reinforced in their struggle to free the city. The Partisans and Florentine citizens
continued their fight against the Germans and, after the Germans‘ departure, against the
pockets of Fascists who remained in the city. The culmination of the Resistance‘s efforts
in Tuscany occurred when they liberated Florence on September 1, 1944, after three
weeks of constant battle. The psychological ramifications from the liberation of Florence
were huge. Italians had not just won a small battle or liberated a minor town, but
managed to liberate the regional capital from both Nazis and Fascists, and had taken over
government of the city. In their effort to liberate Florence, the Resistance suffered over
six hundred casualties with 205 dead and 400 wounded. The Resistance‘s success of
ousting the occupying army prior to the arrival of the Allies proved their willingness,
ability, and right to fight and self-govern.127

Paradoxes
With the escalation of atrocities, some Partisans began to question whether they
were responsible for the massacres. Were their efforts against the Germans worth the
repercussions that the civilians suffered, or would it have been better to await liberation
by the Allies? They questioned how many innocent victims they were responsible for
and if the massacres would have even occurred had the Partisans not harassed the
Germans. In his autobiography, David Irdani, a Partisan, asked himself that very
question but never gave an answer. The author of this thesis questioned one of the
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interviewed Partisans on this matter. When asked if he ever felt responsible for
retaliations against the civilians, he responded that the responsibility and culpability
rested solely upon the Germans and Fascists who committed the atrocities. The
Partisans only waged war against the soldiers, never against the civilians, so they should
never be held responsible for the actions of the murderers.128
The actions of a few Germans were equally paradoxical. Some German soldiers,
disgusted by the horrors they witnessed or were forced to partake in, found solace and a
sense of redemption by joining the Resistance. In his book Sabbiuno di Padermo,
Alberto Preti describes the experience of three German soldiers who join the Italian
Resistance.129 A number of Germans joined the Partisan groups and took to the
mountains; others helped the Italians in a non-combative manner. On 24 August 1944
don Liugi Janni, priest of the town of Vinca, Massa Carrara, was going up the mountain
with his father to meet some of the Partisans. On their way they noticed columns of
Germans headed toward their town. The priest hurried toward town so he could
intervene or give comfort in case of need. Some German soldiers spotted him and tried
to protect him by telling him to escape because their commander was evil. The priest
was captured and executed.130
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Another act of protection on the part of a German was that of Colonel Valentin
Müller, a German medical officer and a Catholic assigned in Assisi. He knew that the
monastery at Cassino had been destroyed and as the front moved up to central Italy the
only way to save Assisi was to make it a hospital city. He used his influence to convince
German higher officials to use Assisi as a major medical center for German troops in
Italy in summer 1944. Assisi was spared from destruction because of Müller‘s efforts.131
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CHAPTER 5
MEMORIALIZATION

Memory changed over time
Memory and public opinion change with the circumstances. At the peak of his
popularity, when Italians were still mesmerized by Mussolini‘s great speeches promising
a renewal of Roman power, the Duce was symbolic of Italian youth and vigor. He
survived several attempts on his life which gave him the aura of divine protection.132
After years of failed military missions and unfulfilled promises of improvements in the
lives of ordinary Italians, public opinion turned against him. By 1942, the Duce was no
longer seen as a strong soldier but as a failed military leader. His romantic escapades
were no longer glorified but viewed as the actions of a coward and adulterer. When he
was removed from power on July 25, 1943, there were spontaneous open demonstrations
against him, and women openly accused him of murdering their sons by sending them off
to useless wars.133 After his execution in April 1945 his body was defiled. It was then
hidden and remained so until September 1957 when it was transported and interred in the
cemetery of Predappio, Mussolini‘s birthplace. While in power Mussolini represented
the rebirth of the Roman Empire; his death represented the death of Italy. Curiously, and
in utter defiance of his consistent record of failure, his mausoleum has become a site of
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pilgrimage for the neo-Fascists who go to honor him and predict his spirit will rise
again.134
In reality Mussolini‘s execution was a necessary clean cut with the past. Italy was
one of the few countries in Europe to make justice on its own; the Italians did not leave it
up to the Allied courts. The forces of the Resistance took matters into their own hands to
reclaim their identity.135 In Italy, as in other occupied countries, at war‘s end there were
spontaneous acts of retribution against those held responsible for the people‘s suffering.
Women collaborators had their heads shaven, while male collaborators were beaten or
hanged. Investigations were conducted, trials held, and some Fascists were held
accountable for their actions and even given the death penalty but few were executed. In
1946 an amnesty was signed by the Communist Party Leader and the Minister of Justice
freeing most of those convicted. By 1950 no Fascists remained imprisoned for their
activities.136
Part of this reflects postwar changed in international politics. Immediately after
the war the Allied Forces investigated war crimes, criminal acts, and abuses of power by
the Nazis and Fascists, both in and outside of Italy, and collected hundreds of documents.
Interviews and investigations were conducted in the region of Tuscany by the United
States Fifth Army. However, soon after, in the interest of normalizing relations between
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Italy and West Germany, solidifying the NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization)
alliance opposition to the spread of communism, and as a result of mismanagement by
the Italian administration the cases were hidden in a closet for decades. L’Armadio della
Vergogna, the closet of shame, became Italy‘s little secret.137 The ―Italian Nuremberg‖
trial that was briefly contemplated from August 1945 to April 1946 never materialized
for three reasons: First, authorities feared that it would complicate Anglo-American
relations with the new Italian elected administration which leaned toward the left.
Second, there were differences of opinion between the United States and the Soviet
Union over who held supreme judiciary authority for judging war criminals. Third, the
Allied powers, the Italian government, and the Yugoslav government disagreed over who
should judge Italian soldiers accused of war crimes in the Balkans.138
Tendencies toward public amnesia concerning the issues of Resistance and
reprisals prompted the Resistance fighters and victims to assume responsibility for
memorializing the events of 1943 to 1945 themselves. At the end of the war the leaders
of the Resistance became preoccupied with preserving the documentation of Partisan
warfare. They could not put their trust in the national institutions that during Fascism had
―Fascisticised‖ the Risorgimento documents. With no adequate or trustworthy official
repository, the former Resistance fighters pushed for the development of institutions to
study the history of the Resistance. The initial phase of the creation of the Istituti per la
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Storia della Resistenza, Institutes for the History of the Resistance, was overseen
immediately after war by Partisan leaders, communists, and Catholics but over time came
under the tutelage of the CLN. They collected and archived over three million documents
which were made available to those studying contemporary history. The document
inventory was second only to that of the state archives although each locality maintained
its own documents and there was no central repository.
While there were political disagreements over who was responsible for what, and
who should be honored or not, there was a greater push for some return to normalcy,
reconstruction of houses and factories, and strengthening the economy. Italy was
devastated, many homes and work-places were destroyed, and people were hungry and
looking for jobs. Everyone had suffered in one way or another, and it seemed useless to
complain or compare what one had endured. The author‘s grandfather, Giuseppe
Senatore, had been taken prisoner in Africa, while her uncle, Pasquale ―Lino‖ Senatore, a
decorated Italian sailor who had shot down a British plane, was later taken as a prisoner
to India. Neither could talk of their experiences as prisoners of war and their suffering
when they returned home because the family in Italy had suffered equal fear, abuse, and
hunger.

The latter had endured Nazi and Fascist round-ups and abuses, had scrounged

for food and had ultimately been thrown upon the mercy of others for charity. No one in
Italy, it seems, had a monopoly on suffering.
Leaders searched for unifying trends to bring the Italian people together.
Immediately after the war there was a need to exculpate the Italians from their association
with Fascism. This was accomplished by depicting all Italians, including all age groups,
all social groups, and all political parties (even the Fascists), as brava gente, good people,
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and by limiting the accusation of killer to the ―others,‖ particularly the officers and men
of the SS.139 The Italian military were not honored nor included in the roles of the
suffering. The role of the Italian army, its successes, its failures, and its participation in
early wartime atrocities in Africa and the Mediterranean were simply ignored. Their past
of noble fighting for their country was tainted by their association with Fascism and the
Axis powers.
Not only were Italians as a whole now portrayed as brava gente, but many
citizens claimed to have been part of the Resistance, either by direct action or in support
of it. However, the great adherence to the Resistance that flourished in the immediate
post-war era began to dissipate. Over the first fifteen years after the war the Italian ―cult
of the Resistance‖ was weakened in part due to a purging of ex-Partisans from police
departments and prefects, in part due to the new parliamentary collaboration between the
Christian Democrat Party (Democrazia Cristiana), DC, and the Neo-Fascist Party
(Movimento Sociale Italiano), MSI, who equated the Resistance with death and sacrifice
and portrayed both soldiers and Partisans as victims.140 In 1947 the Communist and
Socialist parties were expelled from the Italian government so the left felt a need to gain
legitimacy. The Communists in particular pushed for an erasure regarding the violence in
the war of liberation in the collective memory. In its place they promoted the definition
of the Resistance as the ―second Risorgimento‖ in official publications, thus promoting
the idea of a unified Italian struggle against a foreign enemy. This transformed the image
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of the meek, good Italian, who did what he could to survive, into a patriot who fought for
the liberation and independence of his country.141
In 1961 the Soviets erected the Berlin Wall and the Cold War peaked. With many
Italians leaning to the left, the Allies felt a need to appease the Italian Communists to
prevent the further spread of Communism in Europe, or worse, a communist take-over in
Italy.

For the next two decades the Italian Communists appropriated the memory of the

Resistance as their struggle to rid Italy of the Fascist and Nazi oppressors. The Allies and
the Italian right and center leadership did nothing to prevent the propaganda. The
Resistance, with an emphasis on the Partisans, was glorified. The early resisters to
Fascism which included Benedetto Croce, Carlo Rosselli, Antonio Gramsci, and Luigi
Longo were largely ignored in favor of honoring those who participated in the military
Resistance that took place between September 1943 and April 1945.142 The
Communists‘ success in appropriating the credit for the Resistance and liberation of Italy
was exemplified by the commemoration of April 25 (Liberation Day), the beginning date
of a general insurrection against Fascist and German rule, rather than June 2 (Republic
Day) as the holiday to celebrate.143
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Divided Memory
Italians have a divided memory about their role in the war. The unifying memory
is of the period before the war that they remember as the golden era. They somehow
forget about the climate of suspicion and terror under the Fascist rule but instead
remember a peaceful, harmonious time.144 The author‘s own grandmother, Vincenzina
D‘Argenzio, who was totally apolitical, often spoke of the Fascist Era as a time when
people could safely walk the streets, even at night, and when the trains ran on time. She
claimed everyone who wanted to work had a job and life was orderly and peaceful. In
her memory the only ones who suffered under Fascism were the criminals and political
dissidents. Normal hard-working people had nothing to fear.
For many the memory is divided over the role of the Fascists under Mussolini up
to July 1943, and the role of the Fascists under Mussolini‘s Republic of Saló. The diehard Mussolini supporters blame the costly defeat, abandonment and subsequent loss of
over 100,000 Italian soldiers as a turning point and downfall of their Duce on Hitler‘s
obsession with the Eastern Front. They claim it was Mussolini‘s loyalty to his ally and
sense of duty that precipitated his dismissal by the king. Hitler‘s subsequent rescue of
Mussolini and the Duce‘s placement as head of the puppet government of Saló, with no
real power or means, led to the further deterioration of the Fascist Party and power. They
hang on to the belief that Mussolini could have led Italy into a second era of grandeur.
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Then there are the Fascists who were mesmerized by Mussolini, hoped for a new,
stronger Italy, but were soon disappointed by both the methods and the outcome of the
Fascist regime. After the establishment of the Saló Republic, Germany demanded men
and material from Italy which caused dissention among the repubblichini.145 Other
Fascists were that in name only, having adhered to the party only to make life a little
easier and seeing no alternative. Their memory of the Fascist Era is full of contradictions
and conflicts, a time of fear and submission.
Anti-fascists blame the Fascists, along with the Nazis, for acts of violence on the
Italian civilians during the war. The Italian Social Republic or Republic of Saló was
responsible for over 10 percent of the atrocities committed on the peninsula with their
violence directed against political dissidents and those avoiding conscription.146 This
number does not include the atrocities committed by the Italian military on foreign soil.
The Tuscan people in particular are divided in their memory of who was responsible for
the atrocities committed in their region. There is divergence with the locals of Civitella
who blame the Partisans who killed the two Germans for provoking the act of retaliation
from the Germans.147 According to research conducted by Francesca Cappelletto,
cultural anthropologist at the University of Verona, survivors assign responsibility for the
tragedies according to their relationships with the perpetrators. Local perpetrators were
thought to have been forced to carry out the atrocities, while outsiders were viewed as
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directly responsible. Civitella had no Partisan units in its immediate vicinity; however,
there were two autonomous units and two ―outsiders‖ units within a 10-mile radius of the
town (Map 2). This opinion referred to both Partisans and Fascists, so the question was
not one of politics but of relationship with the locals. Still according to her research, in
an unidentified village neighboring Sant‘Anna di Stazzema, the villagers blame the small
groups of Fascists who were ruthless and constantly quarreling for power and who
pushed the Nazis to extreme measures in an effort to end the local feuds. The
townspeople of Sant‘Anna di Stazzema proper blame the Nazis, since there was no
Partisan activity in the town and the reprisals were just an excuse to execute the
atrocities. The townspeople could not accept the idea that their own neighbors could be
responsible for the atrocities.148
Paolo Pezzino, professor of contemporary history at the University of Pisa,
conducted a study of the massacres that took place in Italy where the survivors almost
always remember the SS troops as the responsible parties. His research in the region of
Tuscany showed there were 229 episodes with a total of 3,824 fatalities and in fact, close
to 90 percent of the massacres (204) were carried out by German troops. The interesting
aspect is that only 38 of the 204 massacres were committed as reprisals for actual
Partisan attacks, while 60 massacres took place during searches for Partisans, 40 during
German troop retreats, 38 during forced civilian relocations, 3 as racial motives, and the
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rest as warnings.149 These numbers reflect the acts of a frustrated retreating army taking
its revenge on a civilian population.
Although the regions further north suffered higher numbers of Partisans killed,
Tuscany had the highest number of civilian deaths due to massacres by the Germans and
Fascists. There are several reasons for the high civilian death count in Tuscany. First,
the 16th SS was formed of mostly German soldiers pulled from the Eastern Front. Many
of them had participated in or witnessed the blood baths of the killing fields in Poland,
Russia, Ukraine, and Byelorussia.150 These soldiers had also participated in the atrocities
against civilians in their total war in Yugoslavia and Hungary and witnessed violence in
concentration camps, and had demonstrated a disregard for the conventional rules of
warfare. Second, the Germans were being pushed north by the Allies after their defeat at
Cassino and loss of Rome, but the combat Resistance movement was in its infancy,
poorly organized and equipped, and therefore only waging random acts of sabotage and
destruction. This allowed the Partisans to irritate the Germans but not engage in
meaningful large armed conflicts that would result in great losses. Third, the Partisans in
Tuscany were neither numerous enough nor organized enough to protect the civilian
population from German and Fascist reprisals; consequently, the Germans were able to
take their frustrations out on the Tuscan civilian people.
The region of Tuscany was undergoing a myriad of contradictions and changes.
It was mostly rural, still practicing mezzadria, a share-cropping system in place since the

149

150

Pezzino, 179
Pezzino, 183.

100
middle-ages, but the Tuscans overall had a higher level of education and more social
freedom than people from southern Italy. The factory workers and miners were
influenced by the political organizations of the north but maintained autonomy and
adjusted ideals and actions to suit their regional culture and needs.

The social fabric of

Tuscany had more of a middle class and had lessened the distance between the padroni
and lavoratori, masters and workers. The evolving society was not uniform and each
community developed socially according to its surroundings and individual populations.
Thus, it is not surprising that individual communities, which could be geographically near
one another, remember and/or blame atrocities and massacres on different culprits
depending on their relationship with the parties involved.

The monuments
―The world must remember their dead because memory equals honour.‖151 The
Italian word monumento is translated into English as both monument and memorial
making these words seem interchangeable; however, a monument is erected in someone‘s
honor and is a place of celebration, while a memorial is erected to remember a person or
event and is a place of mourning. This distinction becomes important because over time
many monumenti were erected that evoked strong feelings of resentment from various
groups, and the monumenti became an issue of political contention.
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Immediately after the war the Italian communist party (PCI) erected hundreds of
monuments and shrines to the Partisans. Street names were changed to honor those who
had bravely fought for Italian freedom against superior forces. The majority of those
portrayed in the struggle and named as martyrs were communists. The non-communists
gave credit to the Allied military for liberation from the Nazis, but the Italian people
needed to redeem themselves from the embarrassment that had been Mussolini and
needed to replace their tainted history with a heroic one. Renaming the streets also
served to inaugurate a new political era and create a new public consciousness by
influencing the citizens on what to remember and what to forget.152
In the 1960s, in an effort to pay tribute to all causes and sides, some multipurpose
monuments were erected to honor the heroes of World War I, World War II and the
Colonial Wars together. This was done in part to save money. By incorporating the
fallen of the colonial wars, Italians were honoring their dead without glorifying their own
time of tyranny (when Italians committed atrocities against the people they conquered).
The Monumento ai Caduti, monument to the fallen, was to honor all military that
perished during the conflicts. By incorporating all the wars of the century and not listing
the names of individuals, they emphasized death and loss rather than the heroes. This
amalgamation made no reference to regimes or ideals and was supposed to appease all
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sides of the controversy over who deserved a monument. The result of this neutrality,
however, was that the monuments told no stories and did not attract anyone‘s attention.153
In addition, emphasizing the loss of fallen soldiers was seen by the Left as
competing with the memory of the Partisan and civilian casualties, which in their opinion
deserved the given honor. Until the Resistance and innocent civilians had been properly
acknowledged and honored, any time, money, or effort devoted to the fallen military was
viewed as a return to tyranny and Fascism. The Right did not push for the
acknowledgement of the military because the very honor of the military was being
questioned. Specifically, the role that the Italian military played in the atrocities
committed in the Italian colonies, Libya, Ethiopia, Eritrea, and the Balkans, Greece,
Albania, and Yugoslavia was questioned.
Politicians shifted the emphasis from that of responsibility and justice to that of
unifying the nation, and of honoring those who fought to liberate Italy from its oppressors
and the innocent civilians who were massacred by the unfeeling, inhuman German war
machine. However, even this movement was fraught with division and conflict. The
Left insisted on raising monuments to honor those who fought for the liberation of Italy,
the Communist Party in particular, appropriating the credit for Italy‘s deliverance. Other
political parties that had Partisan formations during the Resistance were largely ignored
or conveniently omitted from the distinction of liberators. Still this failed to unify Italian
sentiment, as part of the population held the Partisans responsible for the atrocities
committed by the Nazis and Fascists for supposed retaliations for Resistance activities.
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Individual communities began erecting memorials to the innocent civilians and
non-combatants who died at the hands of the Nazis or Fascists during the liberation of
Italy; casualties due to Allied bombardments were not included. More division ensued,
with some wanting the distinction of the ―before and after‖ September 1943 casualties,
emphasizing the ―after‖ September 1943 as martyrs for the Resistance cause. This again
brought emphasis not on Resistance as a whole, or as ideology from its inception, but on
the role of the fighting resisters that emerged after the fall of Mussolini‘s Fascist
government. It also arrogated the massacred civilians to the side of the Resistance,
whether they had adhered to it or not. Non-Partisan citizens who were victims of the
total war waged by the retreating Germans were now being glorified or at least
appropriated by the Communists as sacrificial victims.
In some communities in Tuscany, where the population was divided over whom
they considered responsible for the atrocities committed - Germans, versus Fascists,
versus Partisans - it became even more important to separate memorials. Many citizens
did not want the names of the massacred civilians listed on the same memorial with
names of Partisans whom some considered to be the responsible parties for the atrocities
committed. In their opinion, it was the Partisans‘ unnecessary actions against the
Germans that prompted the retaliations in Civitella; as such, they did not want victims
and responsible parties honored together. The main town memorial erected by the
Association of Civilian Victims of War, commemorates the dates and number of victims,
identifying them as victims of a massacre, but does not name the perpetrators. The
memorial is not political but placed to honor the victims.
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In direct contrast, the memorial erected in the town of Niccioletta specifically
blames the Nazi-Fascist soldiers for assaulting their town and transporting to
Castelnuovo, and consequently killing 77 civilian workers. Likewise, the memorial in
San Polo specifically blames the Nazi-Fascists for the ―barbarian slaughter‖ of its
victims. The memorial in Bardine San Terenzo is dedicated to all the fallen and specifies
the war of 1915-1918, the war of 1940-1945, and the civilian casualties. The words
massacre or victim are not included. On the ossuary of Sant‘Anna di Stazzema the
plaque commemorates the town martyrs and states the memorial is erected to express
love and forgiveness in response to the madness that put down 560 innocent victims.
There is no reference to who is responsible for the atrocities.
In most towns the plaques are places at the site of the atrocities, and in some
towns there are several plaques in close proximity, some placed by organizations, some
placed by family members of the victims. However, there is still resentment among some
groups who do not want their relatives or companions listed with ―other‖ groups. The
need for separate and distinct memorials is exemplified in the commune of Cavriglia, a
town half-way between Civitella and Florence, and that has no reported mass atrocities.
However, the townspeople chose to have one discrete memorial erected for each group:
Italian Christian and Jews victims of German prison and labor camps, fallen Partisans,
military veterans, civilian victims, and massacred civilian victims.
Memorials took on different forms, from elaborate sculptures to modest plaques.
They also appeared at different venues, although most part were placed at the sites of the
losses or committed atrocities. These memorials were supposed to be places of mourning
and remembrance for the fallen, but when the A.N.P.I. proposed to place a plaque as a
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memorial to two killed Partisans in the commune of Ciggiano additional political issues
emerged. The two fallen Partisans were killed in front of the property of a known Fascist
family, the Pratesi; members of that family still reside there. The Pratesi had been known
as Fascists during and after the war, so Mr. Pratesi stated that affixing a plaque onto his
property would only serve to incite hostilities against him and his family, or at the very
least, encourage political demonstrations in front of his house. His refusal to allow
placement of the plaque on his property provoked a condemnation from the A.N.P.I.,
which felt that allowing the plaque at the site would show respect and acceptance of the
Partisans as valuable contributors to Italian liberation.154
In 1970, much further north, in the region of Lombardy, the town of Lissone
celebrated the anniversary of the liberation (25 April) by commemorating the Partisans
who fought the Fascists and the Nazis. Three and one half decades later, the same town
erected a monument in the city cemetery to commemorate all the fallen of World War II.
The newer monument elicited vehement opposition by members of the local A.N.P.I.,
who denounced the inclusion of the names of Italian soldiers who fought for the Fascist
regime beside those who fought for Italian freedom or died in the German concentration
camps.155 Thus the dispute over monuments, memorials, their location, and who should
be honored continues.
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The media
In many ways the media profoundly influenced how Italians feel about their
recent history. From the very inception of cinema, movies were used to indoctrinate the
crowds. Mussolini used the media to create an atmosphere of patriotism and give
Italians a feeling of power. Movies like Camicia Nera, Black Shirt, in 1933 were meant
to show Italians how their country was modernized by Fascism. Il Cammino degli Eroi,
The Walk of the Heroes, in 1936, and Sentinelle di Bronzo, Bronze Sentinels, in 1937
were two films glorifying Italians for ―civilizing‖ the Ethiopian savages.156
In the immediate post-war era, numerous films were made that portrayed Italians
as brava gente, good people who had been victims and suffered together. In Roma cittá
aperta, Rome Open City, in 1945, the Italian people‘s will to achieve freedom after
twenty years of tyranny was described. Fuga in Francia, Escape to France, in 1948,
dealt with two issues of the immediate post-war era; the fact that Fascism had not really
been removed from Italy, and emigration as the only true prospect for finding work.
Italy‘s post-war depression and the seemingly desperate lives of the people was portrayed
in Ladri di biciclette, Bicycle Thieves, in 1949, where a man desperate to work and
support his family stole a bicycle after his own was stolen. The movie showed the
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extremes to which men would go to provide for their families. The films reflected the
current political situation and the desperate economic conditions of war-torn Italy.157
Most war movies portrayed the Resistance and Allies fighting the common cause
of expelling the Nazis from Italy. Paisá, Paisan, in 1947 described the Allied advance
from Sicily to northern Italy, the problems in communication and collaboration between
the Italians and Americans. La Ciociara, The Women,158 in 1960, was the story of a
woman trying to protect her teenage daughter during the war. The film was about her
struggles with the locals and Germans, but also brought up the issue of crimes committed
by Allied soldiers. After the war the woman and her daughter were raped by Moroccan
soldiers under the Free French, so the idyllic portrayal of the liberators as total heroes
was tarnished. The movies became a type of monument in honor of those who fought the
Nazis or supported the Allies and a memorial for those who suffered at the hands of the
Allies. The Italians were still being portrayed as brava gente whose lives were
succumbed by the war.159
In the lead years, 1960s to early 1980s, so called for the number of bullets and
bombings used by the left and right extremist groups, movies largely ignored the Italy
post-war era. The media offered a combination of comedies, satires, and spaghetti
westerns to detract from the political situation. One exception was Pasqualino
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settebellezze, Pasqualino Seven Beauties, in 1975, the story of a would-be hood who
portrayed himself as a young gentleman, acted as a snob, and expected his mother and
sisters to act like ladies. Through a series of circumstances he ended up as a prisoner of
war in Nazi Germany. In order to survive in prison, he not only prostituted himself to
the disgusting female commandant, but he ended up killing his companion.160 The movie
portrayed the desperate extents to which common Italian people went for survival. It did
not overtly put the blame on either Germans or Fascists, but portrays a series of events
that lead Pasqualino to perform immoral acts. At a time when the political Left was
glorifying their participation in the Resistance and their contribution to the liberation of
Italy, Italians who had not actively participated in the Resistance, or who had committed
decadent acts in their fight for survival, could identify with Pasqualino and find solace
knowing that others had gone through similar struggles. They were not weak and
corruptible but had been overpowered by forces beyond their control and so remained
brava gente.
The 1990s collapse of the Communist Regime in Eastern Europe brought change
in the Italian political atmosphere. The left‘s push for glorification of the Resistance
movement lost some of its momentum and the portrayal of all Italians as anti-Fascists
was beginning to be disputed. The political and historical discussions began to include
the notion that some Italians were in fact Fascists, or at the very least, were partly
responsible for the triumph of fascism by passively accepting Mussolini‘s rise to power.
Il Sangue dei Vinti, Blood of the Defeated, in 2008 portrayed the tremendous division and
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confusion of the Italians during the war. The father was a World War I veteran and
amputee who taught his children the value of honor and valor. The oldest son was a
policeman in Rome, in the last days of German occupation, with Allied bombings, and
questions regarding who represented the real government and who was in charge. He
coped with the total chaos that surrounded him by ignoring the pandemonium and
concentrating on a homicide. This was his way of bringing some order to daily life. His
younger brother was an Italian soldier who did not know whom to obey, and ended up
joining the Resistance movement. The sister, who still lived with the family in Northern
Italy, was appalled that her younger brother was turning his back on the Italian allies (the
Germans and Fascists) and had become a traitor in her eyes. She joined the Socialist
Movement and took up arms to fight with the Fascists. The movie portrayed all sides and
gives the viewer a realistic view of the confusion and ugliness that permeated in Italy at
the time and the struggles and choices people made.161
Interestingly, none of the above-mentioned movies focused on glorifying the
Italian Resistance; in fact, the Resistance was largely ignored by the Italian film industry
that focused on the solace of the general populace and avoided outright political
controversy.

Instead, it was an American film, Spike Lee‘s Miracle at Sant’Anna that

has sparked a recent controversy. The portrayal of a Partisan as a traitor, one who is
driven by greed instead of loyalty and honor, has sparked the protests of many Italian
Partisan veterans who view the movie as defamatory and an abomination. The Partisan
traitor in the movie is blamed for the massacre, more so than the Germans who commit
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the actual shooting, because he has betrayed his own countrymen. His portrayal taints the
image of the Resistance that the Left has worked so long and hard to achieve.
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CONCLUSION
So who were the heroes and the villains? Despite many studies and researches
into the complex issue of the Italian Resistance during World War II, there is no allencompassing or agreed-upon opinion of the war or the Resistance‘s effort. After Italy‘s
fateful capitulation to the Allies the war itself became even harder to understand and
define. Italy was split in two, geographically and politically, with different foreign
powers to contend with, and with an added civil and class war that further divided the
nation.
The Italian military was one of the primary groups largely ignored by the media
and the scholarship. In the last decade some studies have been dedicated to the Italian
soldiers who resisted the Germans after Italy‘s surrender to the Allies. The Italian
soldiers‘ complex dilemma, lack of leadership, and the ultimate sacrifices of those who
were either murdered by the Nazis or deported to labor camps made them worthy of
honor by at least some of the population.

This group was given a quantity of attention

by the media, and many Italians who had brothers, sons, or fathers in the military at the
time could identify or at least sympathize with their plight. However, over the past five
years, in talking to Italians of all ages, this author has found that the Italian military in
Northern Italy, who adhered to the RSI out of a sense of loyalty to Mussolini, are still
mostly thought of as inhumane savages who looted, raped, and killed their own
countrymen. Their sense of loyalty to Mussolini and to Italy‘s prior ally Germany is
viewed as misguided, a direct result of decades of brain-washing, with no moral value
and not worthy of honor or respect.
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For the most part, memorials for the fallen soldiers have been very general, with
dedications reading ―to the fallen of the wars‖, meaning the wars of the twentieth century.
Some memorials may go so far as to specifically mention the soldiers who stood up to the
Germans in defense of Italy and its liberation but only a handful are dedicated to the
soldiers who fought for the RSI, although they also were Italians, following orders they
believed to be legitimate. As late as 2006, law number 2244, which would have granted
the Fascist soldiers recognition as lawful fighters, was refused due to public opinion.
However, that status was given to the Partisans after the war.162
Although the two Italian militaries had their share of dilemmas and confusion,
their actual location and adherence to particular military units served to identify them as
either RSI or part of the Resistance effort. In contrast, identification of non-military
resisters is harder to determine. While many agree that the classification of Partisan is
restricted to those who participated in armed conflict against the Nazis and Fascists, the
identification of who actually participated in the Resistance is still debated.

The degree

of involvement in the Resistance varies with the individuals, locations, and opportunities.
Some, who during the period of 1943-1945, did nothing to assist the Resistance but
maintained silence about information that could have possibly harmed the Partisans, later
included themselves in the designation of ―resisters‖. Others assisted by giving food and
clothing, which they also gave to POWs, Jews, refugees, and other needy people. While
the benefactors‘ simple acts of humanity and compassion benefitted the Resistance, they
hardly designate them as part of the Resistance. Nevertheless, some claim that the
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charitable acts put the benefactors at risk of reprisal and that they therefore deserve to be
included in the Resistance. The role of the women and the clergy has also been a topic
of intense research. Studies have uncovered varied layers of involvement that range
from ―protecting‖ the Partisans by simply ignoring their location and existence, to acting
as mules, and ultimately directly participating in conflicts.
The ultimate questions, who were the heroes and the villains, have no single
answer. In each geographical location, within each group of people there were heroes
and villains. Though the Nazis are generally depicted as the tyrants, there were Germans
who refused to obey orders to massacre and who did what they could to protect the
innocent. The Fascists are generally grouped with the Nazis; however, there were also
some Fascists who fought to protect the civilian population from its enemies, be they the
Nazis, Allies, or Partisans. Likewise, for decades the Partisans have been portrayed as
the heroes of the Resistance, who through personal suffering and sacrifice achieved the
liberation of Italy. However, there are accounts of independent bands or individuals, who
under the blanket classification of Partisans took advantage of the civilian population by
robbing or threatening them in the name of the Resistance. There were heroes and
villains in all classification of groups and making a general assumption about a group
based on the acts of some individuals does a disservice to all.
War is a time of extremes, when humans are pushed to act in ways they probably
would never consider under normal circumstances. In her book Eichmann in Jerusalem,
Hannah Arendt explains how circumstances can made any simple individual commit
atrocious crimes. She exemplifies her statement by describing the role of the Jewish
leaders in the Holocaust, their willingness to comply with the Nazis to avoid panic or
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further suffering of the Jews, and the role of the Nazis who ordered and/or committed the
atrocities.163 Likewise, Nazis and Fascists in Italy committed unspeakable crimes against
the civilian population, some of whom had aided the Partisans, but some were massacred
for no explainable reason.

The massacres were conducted by individuals who probably

would never have conceived such acts had they not been pushed to the extremes by the
effects of decades of political propaganda, prolonged depravation of human essentials,
and exposure to the brutality of war.
The intricacy of not having a definite description and timeline that encompasses
the various group involved in the war in Italy also creates difficulty in ascertaining
numbers. Assorted official sources differ drastically in the reported numbers of military,
Partisan, and civilian Italian casualties in World War II. In regards to military casualties
most sites do not break down the pre-1943 and post-1943 numbers, nor do they break
them down by geographical location, or government affiliation; their numbers range from
132,000 to 330,000 with one site giving a number of 60,000 soldiers killed prior to 1943.
The number of civilian deaths during the war ranges from 80,000 to 145,000, but again,
there is no definite breakdown on location, timeline, or distinction between massacres
and casualties of war. Finally, the number of Partisan casualties ranges from 44,000 to
65,000 but with no differentiation of Italian Partisans in Italy versus outside the borders,
or foreign Partisans fighting in Italy. Paolo Taviani, an Italian soldier who joined the
Resistance during the war, a scholar, and cofounder of the DC, reports the total number
of Partisans killed at 44,720, total civilians killed in reprisals at 9,980, the highest number
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of Partisans killed in the region of Veneto at 6,006, and the highest number of civilians
killed in reprisals in Tuscany at 4,461.164 Although individual numbers are disputed most
agree that the highest number of Partisan casualties was in the Region of Veneto, while
the highest number of civilians massacred by the retreating German army was in
Tuscany.
The recognition and memorialization of fighting heroes in Italy has changed
several times over the six decades since the end of the war. Some groups have been
totally ignored while others have gone from vilified to being honored. Most of the
memorials and monuments are dedicated to the Resistance. The monuments erected to
honor the Partisans have been considered by some as strictly Communist political
propaganda and have induced repeated feelings of resentment by those who hold the
Partisans responsible for atrocities committed in their area. Further north, and toward the
end of the war, Partisan activity was coordinated with Allied advances, with increased
examples of Partisan combat activity and the resulting detriment to the retreating German
army. However, in the region of Tuscany, Partisan activity was in its infancy, with no
initial support from the Allies, and with little more than minor harassment and no
significant casualties to the German army. Consequently, many argue that the price paid
by the Tuscan civilians for the actions of the Partisans is disproportionate to what the
Partisans in Tuscany were able to accomplish.
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Still others feel that the massacres in Tuscany would have taken place regardless
of Partisan activity, and were terroristic acts of a resentful retreating army. Their claim is
based in part on the notion that some massacres occurred in areas with no Partisan
activity, and that the Germans were retaliating against a nation who had betrayed them
and caused a turn in proceeding of the war. The Germans‘ ―total war‖ was their attempt
to maintain some control over the people and territory still under their occupation. What
the Partisan activity in Tuscany lacked in terms of resulting German casualties, it well
made up in the patriotic awakening of many Italians. The small victories achieved by
the Italian Resistance in Tuscany encouraged northern Italians to actively engage and
combat the Nazis and Fascists. Not only did the Tuscan Resistance manage to organize
and fight against the much stronger foe, it proved to the Allies that Partisans were not a
bunch of marauders; rather, they were trustworthy, dependable, willing, and able to fight
for the liberation of their country if given some logistic support. The Resistance‘s
liberation of Florence was pivotal in demonstrating to the rest of the Italians that they
could defeat the Axis powers that held them down. More than for combat value, the
Italian Resistance was essential for an Italian ―cleaning of the soul‖. By claiming
ownership of the Resistance, Italians could disassociate themselves from the Fascists and
the Germans, otherwise regarded as the losing parties, and transform from a people being
liberated by the Allies, to saving face as co-liberators of Italy.
The Resistance continues to be glorified and in 2008, at the celebrations of the
65th anniversary of the defense of Rome, Italian President Giorgio Napolitano encouraged
Italians to remember, reflect, and convey the legacy of the defense of Rome and the
Resistance.

He spoke of the two aspects of the Resistance: The first was of young men
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who fought in the Partisan formations because of rebellion, redemption and hope of
freedom and justice; the other was of the Italian military that refused to join the German
military after Italy‘s capitulation to the Allies out of their sense of duty to the king‘s
government, loyalty and dignity which resulted in over 600,000 Italian soldiers being
deported to German labor camps.165
While honoring the Resistance has been the popular and ―politically safe‖ stance
to take, some modern Italian organizations are pushing for a unifying thread to celebrate
their country‘s freedom which honors the Italian people as whole rather than specific
groups alone. Others are pushing for an acknowledgment of the Italians‘ responsibility
in and for the war as well as recognition for the Resistance fighters and the sacrifices of
the civilian population. Only by acknowledging all the players and their responsibilities
in the tragedies of war can there be an open, honest discussion on Fascism and
Resistance, and how this influences the modern Italian politics and culture.
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